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The growth of the Internet and other digitization technologies has enabled the unbundling of 
the physical and information components of the value chain and has led to an explosion of 
information made available to consumers. Understanding the implications of this new 
informational landscape for theory and practice is one of the key objectives of my research. 
My dissertation seeks to understand how firms can use their knowledge of online consumer 
search and information seeking behaviors to design optimal information provision strategies. 
The main premise is that consumers’ online search behaviors are key to understanding 
consumers’ underlying information needs and preferences. In my first essay I specifically 
focus on big-ticket, high-involvement goods for which firms essentially have sparse 
  
information on their potential buyers – making information reflected in consumers' online 
search very valuable to online retailers. I use a new and rich source of clickstream data 
obtained from a leading clicks-and-mortar retailer to model consumers' purchase outcomes as 
a function of the product and price information provided by the retailer, and find interesting 
differences for sessions belonging to customers classified as browsers, directed shoppers and 
deliberating researchers. Since consumers typically straddle online as well as traditional 
channels, the second essay in my dissertation examines how online information acquired by 
consumers affects their choices in offline used-good markets. Secondary markets 
characterized by information asymmetries have typically resorted to quality-signaling 
mechanisms such as certification to help reduce the associated frictions. However, the value 
of traditional quality signals to consumers depends crucially on the extent of the asymmetries 
in these markets. The online information available to consumers today may help bridge such 
asymmetries.  Drawing upon a unique and extensive dataset of over 12,000 consumers who 
purchased used vehicles, I examine the impact of their information acquisition from online 
intermediaries on their choice of (reliance on) one such quality signal - certification, as well 
as the price paid. These findings will help firms to better understand how the provision of 
different types of online information impacts consumers' choices and outcomes, and therefore 
help them in designing better and targeted strategies to interact with consumers. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
A good understanding of consumer behavior is the cornerstone of a firm’s strategy. 
Naturally, firms have invested significantly in information systems ranging from point-
of-sale scanners to RFID tags to gather and analyze information relating to consumer 
shopping behavior and purchase patterns. While these information technologies have 
significantly increased our understanding of consumer behavior in traditional channels, 
their potential pales in comparison with the amount and granularity of consumer-related 
information available through online channels. Online retailers today have the ability to 
gather fine-grained information about consumer behavior that can help fine tune their 
strategies to target individual customers and micro-segments in unique ways.  
My dissertation seeks to understand how firms can use their knowledge of 
consumers’ online search behaviors to design optimal strategies for the provision of 
information to customers. The underlying premise is that the online search behaviors of 
consumers reflect their underlying information needs and preferences. Online retailers 
and market intermediaries can then leverage this knowledge to build customized 
interactions with consumers and ultimately, influence their purchase outcomes. Within 
this framework, I describe two essays that examine related questions.  
It is common today for consumers to search online to learn about the assortment 
of available products, brands and prices across firms – information that is likely to 
significantly influence their purchase outcomes. A critical challenge for online retailers 
therefore is to determine what types of product and price information are best suited to 
influence customers to purchase. While it has long been known that not all customers are 




impossible to learn about such latent or unobserved differences in traditional settings. 
The availability of clickstream data however can potentially solve this problem by 
allowing retailers to construct meaningful segments of customer sessions on the basis of 
behaviors observed at their website. The goal of this research is twofold. First, 
consumers' search and navigation behaviors gleaned from clickstream data are used to 
meaningfully characterize consumers in ways that reflect shopping-relevant underlying 
differences across sessions. These differences are referred to as states of shopping. 
Second, I examine whether product and price-related online information had different 
impacts on conversion for customers belonging to various states of shopping, and 
whether information varied in its impacts on purchase related behaviors within a session 
(complete the purchase) and across sessions (return visit and future purchase). A three-
state model comprised of directed shoppers, deliberating researchers and browsers, best 
describes the latent differences across customers shopping for big-ticket durable goods at 
a large US retailer. This categorization allows us to then uncover important differences in 
the effects of three types of product and price information across the three types of 
sessions. An interesting aspect of this model is that by allowing customers to belong to 
different latent states of shopping across repeat sessions to the retailer, we are able to 
uncover tradeoffs or contrasting effects of information on within-session conversion 
versus across-session purchase-related behaviors. The results provide evidence that 
questions the current common practice of offering price promotions such as free shipping 
and product category discounts to all customers that are visiting a store, and highlights 
the ability of rich product information to increase the stickiness of the website and loyalty 




the short term versus developing a longer-term relationship with its customers– it is 
shown show that a different information provision strategy is likely to be optimal. 
In the second essay, given that consumers typically straddle online as well 
traditional channels, I examine the cross-channel impacts of obtaining different types of 
online information on consumers’ purchase outcomes in a traditional market. 
Specifically, the role of information is examined in the market for used goods where 
consumers face ample information asymmetry; and where sellers have typically resorted 
to selling quality signals (for a premium) to help reduce the associated information 
frictions. In recent times however there has been a tremendous growth in the volume and 
type of information related to all aspects of purchasing used vehicles that is available in 
online channels. I specifically study how the increased access to and use of decentralized 
online information related to product and price alters the value of one such centrally 
provided source of information - certification – in the used car market. It is theorized that 
information has both a first order effect on the expected quality or value of the used 
vehicle, and a second order effect on the perceived differentiation between certified and 
non-certified used vehicles- which combine to produce varying effects. Using a unique 
dataset of consumers who obtained vehicle and transaction related information from 
online sources in their used vehicle purchase process, the impact of their information 
acquisition on the choice of vehicle (certified or not), as well as the price paid is 
examined. The preliminary findings from this essay highlights the nature of 
complements/substitutes that emerge among buyers' search for online information related 
to the purchase, their reliance on traditional quality signals, and the price paid. In 




information complements, certification, as indicated by their differential impacts on the 
demand and price of certified and uncertified used cars. The relevance of these findings 
for buyers and sellers are discussed and implications for online information providers are 
outlined as well. 
Together the findings from these studies will allow us to gain a deeper 
understanding of how consumers’ online information search behaviors are related to 
outcomes in online as well as traditional markets, and their implications for firms’ 





Chapter 2: State of Shopping and the Value of Information: 
Insights from the Clickstream  
 
2.1. Introduction and motivation 
Provision of targeted information is ubiquitous on the Internet today, and exists in myriad 
forms across search engines, online social networks, blogs, and various content sites. 
Much anecdotal evidence points to the positive effects of targeting done correctly- 
satisfied users and improved conversion rates. In this study, we extend the notion of 
targeting to product and price-related information that retailers can present in real time 
to customers who are actively visiting their online store. This micro-level approach has 
the potential to be highly interactive and complementary to targeting strategies used to 
attract consumers to e-tailer stores. Real-time targeting requires retailers to present 
custom information that matches their customers’ needs and preferences, which are in 
turn driven by their shopping state during a session. Consumer’s state of shopping is 
however unobserved, requiring retailers to make inferences on the basis of observed 
behavior patterns of consumers. A commonly used source of information about 
consumers in traditional markets, especially for frequently purchased products (or FPP 
such as grocery and clothing), is purchase history (such as recency, frequency and 
monetary value of customers’ transactions). Similar information is scarce for online 
retailers that are typically faced with visits from relatively anonymous or “unidentifiable” 
visitors who form a significantly higher proportion of traffic than “loyal” or “registered” 
customers. This difficulty is especially pronounced for online retailers of less frequently 




retailers usually know very little about the customers that visit their (online) store due to 
the lack of identifiable historical interactions. At the same time, given the nature of the 
purchase involving big-ticket and high-involvement goods, customers are more likely to 
conduct extensive pre-purchase research and place greater value on appropriately targeted 
information that improves the utility of their purchase (Mack 2009; PriceGrabber 
Consumer Behavior Report 2009). Faced with limited interactions and a slim dossier on 
each customer, durable good retailers must seek alternate ways to learn about their 
customers’ needs and preferences. We explore one source of rich micro-level and real-
time information contained in the store-level clickstream data available to online retailers. 
The goal of our research is twofold. First, we seek to meaningfully characterize 
consumers' search and navigation behaviors within a session obtained from clickstream 
data in ways that reflect shopping-relevant underlying differences. We refer to these 
differences as states of shopping. Second, we examine whether product and price-related 
online information had different impacts on conversion for customers belonging to 
various states of shopping, and whether information varied in its impacts on purchase 
related behaviors within a session (complete purchase) and across sessions (return visit 
and future purchase).  
Consumers search online to learn about the assortment of available products, 
brands and prices across firms. By the time they finish their online research, many will 
have made up their minds on what specific product and /or seller to buy from. Even when 
consumers don’t buy within a session, they take away useful knowledge about available 
alternatives – information that is likely to significantly influence their preferences and 




Report 2009). Furthermore, several studies report that retailers’ web sites trump 
manufacturer sites and search engines as the information sources cited by consumers as 
most frequently used for conducting product research online (Compete Online Shopper 
Intelligence Study 2010; iCrossing Report 2010). It is therefore crucial for firms to both 
understand the shopping-related needs conveyed by consumers' online search, and act on 
it by providing the right types of information at the appropriate times to the customer. 
Fortunately, with the growth of clickstream technologies, there has been a phenomenal 
improvement in our ability to understand customers. Clickstream data offers the ability to 
analyze not just the purchase occasion alone, but also the sequence of events that lead to 
desirable outcomes within a website (Montgomery et al. 2004). Consumers’ clicks 
provide retailers with fine-grained insight ranging from their relative level of interest 
across categories and their consideration sets, to the types of information accessed and 
their purchase-related outcomes. 
While it is possible for the retailer to provide a variety of purchase-related 
information, and allow consumers to pick and choose, this is often suboptimal because of 
concerns involving information overload. For a shopper, a cluttered screen is often a 
challenge to navigate; and increases the probability that consumers may overlook 
important pieces of information. On the contrary, consumers may be more receptive to 
and better served by information that is well targeted to their shopping needs. Prior 
research has found that a large part of consumers' pre-purchase search activity involves 
seeking both price and product information, and both have been found to impact 
consumers' choices and outcomes in different ways (Diehl et al. 2003; Klein and Ford 




online channels – free shipping and sales or discounts – are no doubt important in helping 
consumers consummate their purchase; but promotions are frequently margin-eroding 
(e.g., Gelb et al. 2007). Moreover, it is not clear whether they help build a loyal customer 
base that will continue to return to the store, or whether consumers that respond to price 
information are price-sensitive shoppers who seek the lowest price across retailers and 
are less inclined to return when they leave. If the latter was true, focusing on pricing 
alone to attract and convert customers may not be the best long term strategy. As online 
shopping matures consumers are also increasingly seeking to research and understand the 
available product assortments better. Retailers, in turn, are responding by investing costly 
dollars in providing a rich multimedia experience for their online customers in an attempt 
to differentiate from other retailers (Tedeschi 2006). This involves the use of some 
combination of visual merchandising, product configurators, and buying guides, among 
others. Whether rich product-related information can turn casual visitors into repeat 
visitors, and increase their propensity to purchase remains untested. If it did, what types 
of customers are most likely to benefit from the availability of rich product information? 
We lack understanding of when consumers value price-related information more than 
product-related information, and vice versa. Relatedly, are there certain shopping states 
when product (rather than price) information would help move consumers further along 
the shopping process and closer to conversion? We explore answers to these questions. 
We develop cookie-level panel models to describe and assess the impacts of 
online information on purchasing both within and across sessions for consumers 
belonging to different latent states of shopping defined on the basis of their observed 




sessions, and can therefore capture state transitions through time for a subset of 
consumers with repeat visits. We estimate our models using clickstream data from a 
leading click-and-mortar retailer in the U.S. market that covers visits from 77,574 
customers to four best-selling durable products carried by the retailer in late 2006. We 
find that a three-state model comprised of directed shoppers, deliberating researchers 
and browsers, best describes the latent shopping-relevant differences across customer 
sessions in our data. We then uncover important differences in the effects of information 
across the three types of sessions. When examining the impacts on purchase conversion 
within a session, product information had the strongest impact for deliberating 
researchers, while price information about a category-level discount proved useful for 
both directed shoppers and browsers. Price information related to site-wide free shipping 
had a positive impact across a broad set of sessions, highlighting the value placed on free 
shipping by consumers who shop online.  More surprising were the two negative effects 
of information that led online customers to delay a purchase or abandon a session. We 
found that discounts or sales that apply to all products in a given category (e.g., 10% off 
refrigerators) had a negative effect on deliberating researchers, while rich product 
information that highlights various features of product alternatives in a category 
hampered the purchase process of directed shoppers. We describe interesting reasons for 
these unexpected effects of information.  
Our next set of findings highlight important tradeoffs in the effects of product and 
price information on within-session conversion versus two across session outcomes - 
future purchases and the likelihood of repeat visits. Whereas price-related information 




of price information negatively influenced purchase for returning visitors. When online 
customers did not purchase upon receiving price or promotion information, they were in 
general less likely to purchase in future sessions if they returned. Additionally, we 
observe that price information had contrasting effects on customers’ within-session 
conversion and inclination to revisit the store. In contrast, product information positively 
influenced a smaller set of customers to convert within a session, but had a strong impact 
on across-session purchase behaviors, influencing consumers to both revisit and purchase 
in later sessions across all three states of shopping.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we survey existing research 
and discuss our conceptual framework. We describe the data in §3, and develop our 
empirical models and strategy for uncovering latent states of shopping in §4. We develop 
a cookie-panel model and describe our main findings in §5, and examine the robustness 
of our findings in §6. We conclude with a discussion of the implications in §7. 
2.2. Background and Conceptual Framework 
2.2.1 Review of relevant literature  
Given our interest and goals in this study, we draw from two main streams of 
literature. The first stream focuses on characterizing consumers’ clickstream data as a 
new source of insight into their shopping needs and intentions, and the second stream 
focuses on understanding how different types of information affect consumers’ purchase-
related outcomes. In turn, our study aims to combine these insights to develop a micro-
level model of user behavior that can serve as a useful starting point for targeting product 




In the first stream, a large body of existing work spanning computer science, 
information systems and marketing has been devoted to studying consumers' search and 
navigation behaviors in online channels, and broadly suggest that search paths and 
patterns can predict outcomes. Scholars in CS and IS have examined users' paths or 
traversals on the web in an attempt to understand how users surf the World Wide Web 
and to classify their navigation strategies. This literature on web usage mining uses 
descriptive measures to characterize search into meaningful or 'interesting' patterns 
(Canter et al. 1985; Catledge and Pitkow 1995; Tauscher and Greenberg 1997; Yang and 
Padmanabhan 2007; among others) and learn their associations with desired outcomes 
(Cooley et al.1999; Srivastava et al. 2000). Recently, information systems researchers 
have begun to incorporate user intention (Jin, Zhou and Mobasher 2004) and contextual 
information (Adomavicius et al. 2005; Palmisano, Tuzhilin, and Gorgoglione 2007) into 
the study of user search paths.  The resulting models have been then used to implement 
better document or page pre-fetching systems, recommendation systems and adaptive 
personalization systems in online environments (e.g., Perkowitz and Etzioni 1998). Other 
studies have used paths within the context of e-commerce to construct micro-conversion 
metrics based on look-to-click rate, click-to-basket rate, and basket-to-buy rate (e.g., 
Gomory et al. 1999) and to compare the navigation patterns of customers to those of non-
customers (e.g., Spiliopoulou et al. 1999).  
In marketing research, scholars have used path data for predicting conversion 
likelihood. Some studies have examined paths taken by consumers across websites (e.g., 
Johnson et al. 2004; Park and Fader 2004); while others - more closely relevant to our 




Montgomery et al. 2004; Moe and Fader 2004; Sismeiro and Bucklin 2004). Among the 
second set of studies, some have examined search within a session (e.g., Moe 2003; 
Bucklin and Sismeiro 2003) and others have modeled sessions over time (e.g., Moe and 
Fader 2004). However, majority of the studies in this literature have either lacked access 
to or have not modeled the effects of the different types of content (and information) seen 
by the consumers - which is likely to have significantly influenced a large proportion of 
behaviors.  
Studies in the second stream have examined the impact of price and product 
information found online on consumers' market outcomes at the aggregate level (e.g., 
Hodkinson and Keil 2003; Ratchford, Lee, and Talukdar 2003; Viswanathan et al. 2007; 
Zettelmeyer et al. 2005). However, they typically do not distinguish the impacts of 
information across different types of consumers. It is possible that certain types of 
consumers benefit more from product information than price-related information and vice 
versa. Further, while much of the existing work has examined the final purchase 
outcome, it is useful for retailers to understand whether and how information impacts 
other related shopping behaviors such as and adding products to the shopping cart and 
returning to visit the store. 
Our research extends these streams of work to understand how clickstream 
patterns and behaviors can be used to characterize customer sessions in meaningful ways 
that not only differ in navigation patterns, but that also distinguishes consumers 
according to their needs or state of shopping. We then subsequently examine which 




combining relevant findings from both streams of work to develop guidelines for targeted 
information provision at a micro-level.  
In this vein, our work is closest in spirit to a limited number of existing works that 
study consumers’ responses to marketing communications and/or prescribe strategies to 
optimally target messages to individual customers or segments. Rossi et al. (1996) 
studied the problem of using purchase history to design optimal target marketing in the 
offline market. In recent times, studies in this stream have focused on the impacts of 
advertising on the web. Zhang and Krishnamurthi (2004) study the related questions of 
when-how much-and to whom to promote to in an online market for frequently purchased 
products FPP on the basis of past purchase history.  Chatterjee, Hoffman, and Novak 
(2003) model the click-proneness of consumers or their response to web-based 
advertising efforts using clickstream data, but do not examine whether clicks led to 
purchase outcomes.  Manchanda et al. (2006) study the effect of banner advertising on 
purchasing behavior using a limited clickstream dataset. Since they only observe those 
consumer visits to the site that resulted in a purchase, they estimate a conditional model 
of the effect of advertising on consumers who buy at least once. Also, they do not 
observe the content of the advertisements- and therefore cannot distinguish between the 
impacts of product vs. price-related information and promotions.  
In contrast to these existing works, we use a rich clickstream dataset to distinguish 
among different types of product and price information made available by retailers, and 
identify the level of exposure to information in an individual session. We then examine 
the impacts of information by combining techniques from the clickstream modeling of 




cookie-level heterogeneity in unobservables. Another important modeling distinction in 
our work is the examination of the final purchase outcome, rather than brand-choice 
which is commonly studied in much of the existing works in the marketing literature (a 
few exceptions are Manchanda et al. (2006) and Bucklin and Sismeiro2004)). In our 
study, we therefore fix the brands and focus on the purchase outcome. Finally, by 
studying the online purchase incidence of durable goods, our works adds complementary 
knowledge to the literature that primarily focuses on FPP. Specifically we expect that 
online information would play a greater role for durable good purchases where past 
experience and experiential learning may be limited, and therefore consumers are likely 
to conduct extensive pre-purchase search for product and price-related information. 
Next, we describe techniques to identify consumers that differ in their shopping 
orientation, and three types of product and price-related information provided by retailers 
in online settings. 
2.2.2 Consumers’ Latent States of Shopping 
It is now well understood that not all shoppers are in the same state or mindset 
when shopping for products, and these underlying differences are known to be reflected 
in their offline search behaviors (Cox 1967; Putsis and Srinivasan 1994). Such variances 
are likely to translate into the online market as well. Clickstream data, in particular, are 
composed of navigation trails from a diverse set of customers, who have varying 
purchasing needs and goals (Bucklin and Sismeiro 2003; Moe and Fader 2004). Treating 
consumers as homogenous may thus be erroneous.  
In the offline channel, several studies relay empirical support to the ability to use 




differences (e.g., Olshavsky 1985; Payne et al. 1993). However, given the limited ability 
to track consumers' search offline these models tend to lie at an aggregate level. In this 
study, we examine consumers' search at a more nuanced level that allows us to examine 
their intermediate decision-making and information-seeking behaviors, thereby, 
providing greater insight into both how consumers search and navigate, and what 
(information) drives their purchase behaviors. We thus infer consumers’ latent shopping 
needs and orientation from their observed session-level behaviors.  
We borrow from existing studies that have attempted to characterize these 
differences in several ways. Li et al. (1999) categorized customers by their online 
"shopping orientations", but focused on demographic determinants rather than buying 
behaviors. Koufaris et al. (2001) focused on the type of search mechanisms used online, 
but did not provide any typology of search behaviors. In a set of studies that closely 
informs our work, Hoffman and Novak (1996) and Dholakia and Bagozzi (2001) divided 
online customers' search processes into goal-directed and experiential. These studies 
however did not discuss the antecedents or the effects of the mind-sets on purchase 
outcomes. Building on this stream, Moe (2003) divided online customers into four 
categories based on customers' search behaviors (directed versus exploratory) and 
purchasing horizon (immediate versus future). Using content viewed online, consumers 
were categorized as belonging to buying, deliberate-searching, browsing, and knowledge-
building states in the shopping process. The existing literature thus suggests that 
consumers at an online retail store would be likely to fall within the continuum of latent 




Exploratory browsers are undirected, less-deliberate and stimulus-driven 
(Janiszewski 1998). This type of search, as found in prior literature, may not necessarily 
be motivated by a specific goal, and consumers derive utility not from the outcomes of 
search, rather, from the process of searching and visiting a site. Experiential behaviors are 
often part of a consumer's ongoing search process (Hoffman and Novak 1996; 
Wolfinbarger and Gilly 2001). By contrast, directed searchers are focused in their search 
and are driven by a goal (Janiszewski 1998). Consumers who conduct directed search 
obtain utility by clicking and traversing through paths that allow them to gather 
information related to a product of interest or an impending purchase (Childers et al. 
2001; Titus and Everett 1995; Hoffman and Novak 1996).  
2.2.3 Online Information 
The web offers retailers the valuable ability to influence customer purchase 
behaviors by providing them information in real-time as they browse or shop their online 
store. While information in online markets may come in a variety of forms, we focus on 
information that is directly provided by the firm to actively searching consumers at its 
online store – the content and availability is therefore under the control of the firm1. Past 
research has generally found that both product- and price-related information play key 
roles in a firm's information provision efforts by providing consumers with appropriate 
information to aid in the reduction of uncertainty or costs associated with the purchase of 
products (Diehl, Kornish and Lynch 2003; Klein and Ford 2003; Lynch and Ariely 2000).  
                                                 
1 Additionally, consumer-generated content such as reviews and ratings may also be classified as information available 
at an online store, when it is made available by the seller on the store website. However, we do not study this type of 
information since its content is not usually under the control of the retailer. We also do not include advertising 
information sent to passive consumers (e.g., via email or banners) with the goal to induce them to visit (rather than 




In this study, we specifically consider three types of information- category-
specific product information, category-specific price information and generic price 
information. This information is retailer-provided and generally not brand-specific. 
Product information provides consumers with greater knowledge related to the 
capabilities, features, uses and applications of the products in a product category, thereby 
allowing consumers to better “experience” products (Lucas 2001). Such superior product 
knowledge may help consumers to lower their uncertainty and increase their utility for 
products in that category. In online markets, such non-price information may include the 
use of multimedia and microsites to provide rich media product configurators, buying and 
comparison guides, and video/audio demonstrations of features.  
Price information informs consumers about ways to lower the monetary cost or 
price associated with the purchase of products. We identify two separate types of price 
information- category-specific price information and generic price information. 
Category- specific price information offers consumers price incentives to purchase 
products from select product categories (such as "Huge savings on home furnishing-10% 
off", "Tool sale- buy one, get one free", "End of season special values on all kitchen 
appliances").  Generic price includes information about a price reduction or discount that 
may be applied to any purchase at the firm's website and is therefore not specific to any 
one particular category. Examples in this category of price information include offers on 
shipping and delivery fees (such as "free shipping on orders over $X", or “free shipping 
today”).  
From the retailer’s point of view category-level product and specific price 




generic price information increases the utility for any product in the web store. 
Examining the impacts of information at this level is consistent with our interest to study 
purchase incidence rather than brand choice. While not intending to be comprehensive, 
our categorization of online information captures a bulk of the types of product and price 
related information that online retailers use today and is a useful starting point for teasing 
apart the effects of information on different types of customers that visit an online store. 
2.2.4 Discussion 
We examine whether consumers respond differently to the three types of product 
and price information provided by the online retailer. We use a data-driven approach to 
empirically determine the optimal number of states of shopping. Aside from resulting in 
differences in observed search and navigation behaviors, membership in various latent 
states is likely to differentially impact the likelihood of purchase (Moe 2003).  In the 
traditional channel, researchers have described the existence of a purchase funnel that 
consists of a sequence of increasingly directed or focused stages that consumers progress 
through when making purchase related decisions (see Lee and Ariely’s (2006) shopping 
goals theory; and Trope and Lieberman’s (2003) construal level theory among others). 
We expect to find that on average customers who are browsing will have a lower baseline 
purchase propensity than customers who are closer to the directed shopper end of the 
state spectrum and often further ahead in the planned purchase process. Consumers in the 
middle of this spectrum have in past studies been found to be researching about an 
impending purchase in a product category of interest (e.g., Moe 2003). We expect that 




Controlling for their baseline purchase propensities, we are interested in the impacts of 
online price and product information.  
Directed buyers have typically completed their research and information 
gathering process, and are closer to finalizing their purchase. It has been observed that 
consumers at this stage shop around retailers and price comparison websites to determine 
the locations of acceptable low prices (Wolfinbarger and Gilly 2001). We expect that 
such consumers will therefore benefit most from the availability of price promotions than 
product information because they offer the best value for their already selected 
product(s). A sale in a product category that a directed consumer wants to make a 
purchase in or a (free) shipping offer can be extremely successful in incentivizing her to 
complete the purchase, and preventing her from delaying the purchase, or worse, 
abandoning the site in search of better deals elsewhere. At the other extreme are 
consumers who are browsing the retail store and spend their time visiting several product 
departments or categories. Often, they do not have a particular product purchase in mind 
when they start their session. Some subset of browsers may also be seeking knowledge 
about a category that they are interested in but perhaps not considering making a near-
time purchase (Moe (2003) refers to them as knowledge builders). Thus we may observe 
unplanned or impulse purchases from this group when they obtain information that 
renders a purchase sufficiently attractive. In an industry study sponsored by the Yankee 
Group and Ernst and Young (2002), the top two factors that contributed to such a 
spontaneous impulse purchase indicated by survey respondents were a special sale price 
(75% respondents) and free shipping (49% respondents). Thus purchases made by 




appearance of a “good deal” or a “value buy”. Product-related information, on the other 
hand, can engage the browsing customer, and help them discover new categories. Some 
work exists that suggests that spontaneous purchases can be driven by strong emotional 
reactions to products (Rook, 1987; Rook and Gardner, 1993), or by causing consumers to 
become more involved in the product category (Bloch and Bruce, 1984; Laurent and 
Kapferer, 1985; Schmidt and Spreng 1999) – both of which may be evoked using rich 
product stimuli.  The relative effect of product vs. price information on browsers remains 
to be tested.  
Consumers whose state of shopping lies in between directed buying and browsing 
actively seek to obtain information to learn about available brands/features and decide 
amongst alternatives. Thus, product information in the form of buying guides, 
configurators and rich multimedia tools can be useful in educating the consumer and 
enhancing their product experience, while also helping move them closer to completing 
the purchase or becoming directed buyers. Specific and generic price-related information, 
however, do not help consumers make choices among or compare alternatives since they 
render all alternatives in a product category more attractive.   
Finally, we are interested in studying the relative effects of product and price 
information on purchase oriented outcomes within a session versus across sessions. Next, 
we describe our data and empirical strategy. 
2.3. Data 
We use a unique clickstream dataset obtained from a leading click-and-mortar 
retailer of durable goods. We are interested in purchase incidence, and therefore fix the 




retailer (henceforth referred to as focal products), and obtained all relevant clickstream 
where that product was viewed (clicked on) during consumers’ visits to the e-tailer. This 
extensive dataset includes all searches conducted by online consumers who visited the 
retailer’s website and clicked on one of the focal products during a contiguous 30-day 
period in late 2006. Each visit by a consumer to the website is recorded as a session, 
consisting of an ordered and time-stamped sequence of clicks to the online store pages. 
The clickstream data is a rich source of information about consumers’ activities at a 
website and provides detailed insight into the type of pages viewed including category 
pages, product pages, information pages, promotions, customer service, catalogs etc. It 
also contains information on consumers’ use of various search tools and decision-aids to 
refine and screen product alternatives using price, brand, features and other attributes. 
See Tables 2.1a and 2.1b for a view of the partial clickstream of two users, one who 
doesn’t purchase and another that buys in a session, respectively.  
Clickstream data offers some benefits over data from websever logs. In the latter 
case, each page request by a user tends to generate several server hits from graphics, 
multimedia, and content on the page, thus requiring that the hits be aggregated to 
correspond to a meaningful user page request. With clickstream, each page view 
corresponds to a single individual page or URL requested by the user, making it much 
cleaner and more complete. However, clickstream data is in text form and requires 
extensive pre-processing before it can be formally analyzed. The information contained 
in each click must be parsed in order to determine the nature of the content that the 
customer viewed. The clickstream data is first filtered using a custom-built parser written 




click, and encodes the text into numeric form amenable to quantitative analysis. In order 
to accurately encode the content seen by the consumers, we also downloaded all relevant 
pages from the retailer’s online site during the period of data collection. 
2.3.1 Sample Construction 
The total number of unique sessions in the dataset, identified by a unique 
combination of cookie ID and session ID, equals 86,231. We eliminate sessions which 
included only one page view2, and also removed sessions where no product pages and 
products were viewed. An important limitation of using clickstream data is that we 
cannot determine with certainty what product was purchased if we do not observe the 
product that the consumers clicked on to add to the shopping cart. We therefore limit our 
examination to sessions where the consumer clicked on a focal product to view it3. This 
resulted in 43,041 sessions. Finally, to ensure that we do not capture only the repeat 
sessions of visitors who might have made their first visit in the days preceding our data 
collection, we dropped all sessions in the first two days of our sample time period. This 
choice is supported by findings from a study of over 150 million online transactions 
across 800 retailers that found that when shoppers left an online store due to concerns 
about security, brand trust, and the need to price-compare, nearly 80% of those who 
return did so within 1-2 days (McAfee 2009). Our final sample consists of a total of 
40,740 sessions from 36,636 unique users (cookies). The total number of sessions that are 
repeat visits is 4,102 resulting in 7,104 total sessions (17.44%) from 3,002 repeat visitors. 
                                                 
2 These one-page visits could simply comprise store hits where the consumer accidentally landed on the firm's website, 
specifically a focal product page, from a search engine and immediately abandons the session. 
3 There are a few cases where we observe products added to the shopping cart without the consumer having clicked on 
the product to view it. This highlights a limitation of clickstream data in that we only have information on actions 
captured as a click. If a consumer views the product without actually clicking on it, and subsequently adds it to the cart, 





In this session level sample, the visit to cart ratio is 9.31%, the visit to buy ratio is 2.06%, 
whereas the conditional cart to buy ratio is 22.12%. At the cookie level 2.30% of 
consumers make a purchase. 
2.3.2 Measures 
Outcome: The purchase outcome is measured as a binary variable that indicates 
whether a consumer completed the purchase 	
. As a first step, we track 
whether consumers added a product to the shopping cart (measured using a binary 
variable ). Following this, consumers at the retailer’s store have to complete a series 
of three steps in order to complete a purchase – these are tracked as step1, step2, and 
step3 in the clickstream data (see Table 2.1b). A purchase is considered complete only 
upon completion of step3. Sessions where consumers added to cart, but did not complete 
step3 are referred to as abandoned sessions. In addition, we also construct a count 
measure (	_) that is closely related to Purchase – the number of purchase 
related steps completed by a user during a session, with a higher count indicating greater 
likelihood of completing the process. 
Information: The retailer uses the following features to enhance consumers’ 
product-related experience and to provide product-related information 
: 
product buying guides, multimedia to demonstrate product features, and tools to provide 
dynamic design ideas to promote a product category. All four product categories offered 
consumers multiple product information features and tools. Price-related information in 
turn provides the consumer with information on monetary incentives associated with 
purchasing a product. Generic price information 	
 includes an offer of free 





refers to information on the sales and promotions available for 
products in specific product categories. During the time of the data collection, there were 
category-specific price sales for three product categories. These three types of 
information had differing patterns of availability at the store, thereby allowing us to 
separately identify the effects of each. Further, the retailer did not target the price and 
non-price promotions to customers. A binary variable indicates whether consumers 
obtained each type of information - , 	, 	. 
States of Shopping: Individual sessions form the basis for categorizing 
consumers’ state of shopping, which as theorized, can change across sessions (over time) 
for a given consumer. However since the state is actually latent, we infer it from observed 
search behaviors and navigation patterns of consumers across the website. We borrow 
from past work in identifying variables including the breadth, depth, and intensity of 
search to differentiate between directed versus browsing behaviors (e.g., Moe 2003; 
Wolfinbarger and Gilly 2001).  
The breadth of search is defined using two measures - the number of unique 
product departments 		
viewed, and the number of unique product 
categories viewed4 	
. The first refers to search across highly unrelated 
product categories or departments- e.g., clothes, food and decorations. The second refers 
to search within a department and across related product categories- e.g., men's clothes, 
women's clothes, and accessories. The depth of search reflects the extent of hierarchical 
search within the product category of the focal product 	
, and is measured as the 
maximum number of times the customer drilled-down or hierarchically narrowed down 
                                                 
4 The online store is broadly organized as departments (Appliances) categories (kitchen appliances) specific 




the search results. This measure is normalized since the four product categories allow for 
a different maximum depth by design of the category.  
For intensity of search, we create a set of variables that measure the level of 
involvement the shopper experienced in a given session. We measure the total time spent 
in minutes5 	
and the number of pages 	
 visited in the session. 
We also include squared values of these two measures. We count the total number of 
unique product pages viewed by the consumer during the session 
. A 
product page is counted when the consumer clicks on a particular product to view its 
details, and not if a product is only seen listed as a collection of available alternatives 
within a category.  Additionally, we create two related ratios –the number of product 
pages accessed per minute 		
 with a lower number indicating that the 
consumer is more engaged with (reading and processing rather than skimming) the 
content, and the ratio of product pages to the number of categories visited during the 
session  	
where a larger number would indicate either that the 
customer was focused and searched only a few categories and/or that she viewed many 
product pages (across all categories that she accessed). 
Controls: We control for several additional variables that may impact purchase 
outcomes. The first set consists of consumers’ use of electronic decision aids to screen 
and refine the available assortment of products in a category. Past research has observed 
that by changing the composition of considered alternatives, the use of these tools may 
shape consumers’ decision processes and have significant impacts on consumers’ 
                                                 
5 A well-known limitation of clickstream data is that the length of time spent on the last page is not recorded. This 
information is censored because while we know when the user accessed the last page, we do not know when the user 





purchase behaviors (see Alba et al. 1997; Diehl et al. 2003; Hoffman and Novak 1996; 
Lynch and Ariely 2000; Winer et al 1997). We distinguish between consumers whose 
refining and screening criteria were primarily focused around price related attributes such 
as “under X dollars”, “between X and Y dollars” 	!			
 versus product 
related attributes such as brands and features !			
6. Another available 
tool is text-based search, using which consumers can directly search and locate items of 
interest using a textbox 	"	
. This is an alternative to searching for products by 
using hierarchical search or drill-down through departments, categories and sub-
categories. Finally, consumers in our study were also able to conduct comparisons of 
selected products using a side-by-side comparison matrix "
. All four 
measures are calculated using consumers' extent of tool usage during a given session. 
We include date controls 	
in order to account for fluctuations or differences 
in the online environment from one day to the next that are not observed by us. We 
include the time of the day of the session is measured using dummies for morning, 
afternoon, or evening/night 	#
, whether the session was started on a weekend 
$		%	
, the month of the session visit as a binary for September or October 
&
, whether the session was a repeat visit  		&
, and the order of 
the session within a cookie '	
. We also include dummy variables to classify 
the session as having conducted a search for one of the four product categories 
(#	
, and an indicator for whether the consumer logged into a user account at 
the website (
 prior to adding a focal product to the cart. We also track the 
number of times during the session that the consumer viewed the following types of 
                                                 
6 We note that this measure of a consumer’s price-product sensitivity is distinct from their responses to product and 




pages: home and sitemap related pages )		
, local retail store and catalog pages 
		
, pages external to the retailer’s site (linked to from the retailer’s site) 
*"		
, and pages that are marked with error messages *	
. We 
also measure views of user generated content such as reviews and ratings 
+ 	,	-
. 
2.4. Session Level Model of Purchase Behavior 
As a first step, we are interested in distinguishing sessions or visits made to the 
online retailer by customers. The notion of the purchase funnel suggests that consumers 
may progress from relatively undirected to more focused states of buying. In order to 
allow consumers to belong to different latent states of shopping across multiple sessions, 
we categorize consumer behavior at the level of a session given only observed values. 
Our data display a high proportion of zeros, as is expected in a purchase dataset. One 
approach to handle this is to use a hurdle or zero inflated models that separate the 
probability of obtaining a zero outcome from the probability of nonzero outcomes 
(Winkelmann 2008). However, we expect that consumers belonging to any state will 
experience a non-zero probability of purchase – that is both non zero and non-zero values 
can be realizations from the same underlying stochastic process. This aspect is better 
captured using finite mixture models7. This is because all consumers who have a zero 
count of purchase related pages do not necessarily belong to the same subpopulation or 
distribution – rather, browsers who do not buy have different underlying reasons than 
directed buyers who do not buy, and the finite mixture model can accommodate that 
                                                 
7 The finite mixture model produced better overall fit than alternative ways to handle the prevalence of 
zeros. Furthermore we focus on classifying sessions rather than consumers, which in later models will 




therefore producing a better fit for our data. Our underlying belief is that product and 
price related information found in online environments may have different impacts on 
purchase likelihood and outcomes for consumers in different states of shopping, which in 
turn may be proxied through shopping and searching behaviors observed in clickstream 
data. Thus while we use the observed breadth, depth and intensity  measures to help 
identify consumers belonging to different states, our main interest lies in then examining 
how the three types of information affect outcomes across states.  
In §2.4.1, we adopt a clustering via mixture models approach to determine 
consumers’ latent states of shopping – where it is assumed that data are generated by a 
mixture of underlying probability distributions in which each component represents a 
different group or cluster. While our primary dependent variable is 	 – due to 
complications in the identification of binary mixtures8,  we apply the mixture model to 
the count outcome measure (there is a high correlation between 	  and 
	_  with ρ = 0.904, p = 0.000) where we model all components as derived 
from the same distributional family, namely, poisson for which generic identifiability 
exists (Titterington et al. 1985).  
In §2.4.2, we describe the results from the session-level model and determine that 
a 3-segment solution provides the best fit for categorizing sessions. We then use a highest 
posterior probability assignment rule to assign sessions to a latent state of shopping. This 
assignment is then used to re-examine our model and its robustness to how we measure 
purchase using the binary outcome and a full set of controls. 
                                                 
8 Identification in a binary outcome  model generally requires that we observe consumers repetitively in T> 
2K-1 sessions (K is the number of component distributions). Unfortunately due to data limitations, that 





 Let Y be the non-zero integer valued random variable that measures the count of 
purchase completion pages visited by the user in a session. In the base-case Poisson 
regression model, the probability mass function of Y is given by 
/0 1 2




Where 9 is the mean or E[Y]. In a Poisson mixture model, 9 is treated as a stochastic 
variable with mixing density function f(9
. 
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Further, finite mixture models treat the mixing density as discrete and arising from a 
fixed number of components G with the probability that an observation belongs to g=G 
equal to => and component specific mean or rate 9>. 
/0 1 2
 1  ∑ 345@A7BC72B2!DBEF GB       (1) 
The log of the component-specific rate is modeled as a linear function of covariates 
though to exhibit differences across latent subgroups of consumers. Given that mixture 
models can get easily complicated to estimate when the parameters grow, we estimate a 
simple yet parsimonious model to determine the usefulness of a mixture setup for our 
data. The covariates include whether consumers obtained each of the three types of 
information online, and the set of seven breadth, depth and intensity BDI measurers 
(RatioProdtoCatPages is excluded due to collinearity). 




1 KIL /MN<OP;NH′ JLMN< Q R/MHSKOP;NH′ JTLMHSK Q D/MHSKOP;NH′ JBLMHSK Q
UVOH′ JW<H
    
Where  1 1, … … , Z  sessions       (2)  
JLMN<, JTLMHSK, JBLMHSK are the coefficients of online information  
JW<H are the coefficients of breadth, depth and intensity measures 
As discussed above, we anticipate that consumer sessions belonging to different 
latent states of shopping may experience varied impacts of covariates, specifically 
product and price information obtained during the session on purchase outcomes. Such 
response heterogeneity is well documented in the marketing literature (e.g., Chintagunta 
1993; Jain and Vilcassim 1991; Wedel and Kamakura 2000). In the past researchers have 
observed that there may be unobserved heterogeneity not only in the intercept parameter 
but also in the slope parameters, i.e. the covariate coefficients (Allenby and Rossi 1999). 
As shown in prior work by McLachlan and Peel (2000) and Wedel and Kamakura (2000), 
finite mixture models are a useful tool to segment or group observations by differences in 
the effects of covariates on the dependent variable. Each support of such a heterogeneity 
distribution can be interpreted to represent a subset of (consumer) sessions in the online 
store, and can be used to differentiate among sessions. The finite mixture model uses a 
discrete mixing distribution of the parameters and simultaneously estimates both 
consumers’ membership in latent states and their session-level response parameters to 
improve both the identification of states and model fit across the states.   
It would be appropriate here to briefly discuss alternative ways to model 
heterogeneity. Finite mixture models have been shown to outperform traditional post hoc 




apply a continuous mixing distribution to efficiently estimate average effects but they 
remain uninformative about responses at a specific disaggregated levels (or segments) 
which are of interest to us. Hierarchical Bayesian models estimate individual-level 
parameters but have been shown to be equivalent in performance to finite mixture models 
in identifying latent heterogeneity across several analyses9. Given our interest in 
identifying the latent states of shopping that groups of customer sessions resemble, we 
determine that a finite mixture model is especially useful and managerially appealing in 
our context, and therefore considered more appropriate than other alternatives.  
As a middle ground between pooled and individual heterogeneity models, finite 
mixtures assume that the observed variables come from a population consisting of a finite 
number of homogeneous groups. We assume that the observations #[ are drawn from a 
G-component density f, and the mixture distribution is given by the weighted sum across 
the g components.  
Pr (2H  \ population g) 1  GB                                                                                     (3) 
The g-component mixture density is given by: 
;2H| /MN<OP;NH, R/MHSKOP;NH, D/MHSKOP;NH, UVOH;  _F, … _D;  GF, … , GD
 1
 ∑ GB;BDBEF 2H| /MN<OP;NH, R/MHSKOP;NH, D/MHSKOP;NH, UVOH ;  _B
              (4) 
 GB is the prior probability that observation #[ belongs to component g. ` a GB a 1 and  
∑ GBDBEF 1 F. For identification, we follow the labeling restriction that GF  b  Gc  b
d b  GD, which can be satisfied by rearrangement after estimation (Titterington et al. 
1985) 
                                                 
9 We refer interested readers to discussions in Wedel et al. (1999); Andrews, Ansari and Currim (2002) and others that 




_B are component parameters that are estimated by maximizing the following log 
likelihood  
ef4g,_ hh 1
∑ @i j@∑ GB;B@2H| /MN<OP;NH, R/MHSKOP;NH, D/MHSKOP;NH, UVOH;  _BCDBEF CCkHEF   (5)  
The posterior probability that observation 2H belongs to component g given by 
Bayes theorem conditional on observed covariates and the outcome. 
lm 2H  \  5n5oifpqnj r | /MN<OP;NH, R/MHSKOP;NH, D/MHSKOP;NH, UVOH, 2H;  _
  1
                                          GB;B@2Hs  /MN<OP;NH,R/MHSKOP;NH,D/MHSKOP;NH,UVOH,_BC∑ GB;B@2Hs /MN<OP;NH,R/MHSKOP;NH,D/MHSKOP;NH,UVOH,_BCtruF                    (6) 
Each session is then assigned membership into a group representing a different 
latent state of shopping for which it has the largest (posterior) probability.  
2.4.2 Estimation and Results  
The model is estimated using the EM algorithm within the maximum likelihood 
framework (Dempster, Laird and Rubin 1977). For each fixed value of the number of 
components, the unobserved component memberships of the observations are treated as 
missing values and the data are augmented by estimates of the component memberships, 
i.e. the estimated a-posteriori probabilities, iteratively. Estimation of the model requires 
the provision of initial values for cluster membership, and we reran the models with 
several random starting points in order to avoid settling on local optima. Identification of 
count based mixture models has been proved by Teicher (1963) who show that a 
necessary condition is that matrix of covariates be of full rank.  
We estimated our model by increasing the components from 1 to 4. Prior work 




it is more appropriate to use information criteria to select the best model. We use three 
commonly used criteria: AIC and AIC3 (Bozdogan 1987), and BIC (Schwarz 1978). The 
model is chosen on the principle of parsimony that all else equal, for the same log 
likelihood, we should prefer a model with fewer parameters. The best model is the one 
that minimizes 62 w xx Q  w ; where  is the number of free parameters in the model 
and  1 2 for AIC,  1  Z for BIC, and  1 3 for AIC3. There is recent evidence 
that the AIC3 measure is more appropriate for discrete data (Andrews and Currim, 2003), 
and has shown remarkable performance in identifying the true model with only minor 
overfitting in Monte Carlo studies (e.g., Dias and Vermunt 2007). These studies also 
found that increasing the sample size usually led to reduction in the overfitting (except 
for AIC). AIC, on the other hand tends to choose the model with more parameter 
complexity, while BIC places a heavy penalty on complexity, and for small or moderate 
samples, often chooses models that are too simple. In our model, these model based 
criterion suggest that the 3-component solution provides the best (or second-best) fit for 
our session-level data as indicated in Table 2.2. Moreover, as discussed next, this 
clustering provides meaningful groupings of customer sessions that are likely to be useful 
for online retailers who lack other information about their customers. 
2.4.3 The Latent States: Characterization and Results 
Our goal in using mixture models is to uncover underlying differences across 
consumers. From a managerial perspective as well, the usefulness of segmentation lies in 
its ability to uncover meaningful groupings that obtain different benefits from product 
and price related messages.  We begin by characterizing differences across the three 




unique department and category breadth – that is they visited very few categories 
compared to sessions in State 3, which had the highest numbers on both breadth 
measures. Customers in State 2 performed the highest number of hierarchical drill-downs 
(depth of search starting from departments to categories to products) while customer 
sessions in State 3 contained the fewest.  
Next, we assess an array of variables that indicate the level or intensity of focus 
displayed by a customer in their session. Customer sessions categorized as State 1 viewed 
the highest number of pages and spent the longest time on the website. Sessions in State 2 
and 3 differed little along these two attributes. However, customers in State 2 viewed a 
significantly higher number of product pages (nearly double that of customers in state 1). 
Thus while customers in State 1 viewed more pages overall, only a small share were 
product pages, and a majority included pages related to the store, promotions, specials, 
and retailer policies. Another related distinguishing variable is the ratio of product level 
to category level pages which is the highest for sessions in State 2, followed by sessions 
in State1 and then State 3. This variable provides one measure of the intensity of product 
search conducted within (focal) product categories. For sessions in State 3 this lower 
number indicates either that they viewed fewer product pages or conducted a dispersed 
search across many categories. Customers in State 2 and State 1 viewed significantly 
fewer product pages per minute than browsers did indicating that the former may have 
spent more focused time engaging with (reading about) products. Finally, State 1 sessions 
had the highest likelihood of being a repeat visit for a cookie.  
On the basis of the above characterization, we conclude that sessions in State 1 




(Moe 2003), sessions in State 2 are similar to searching and deliberating users who are 
conducting research and learning about products in the focal category, and sessions in 
State 3 are best described as browsers or experiential window shoppers whose interests 
were not focused. We refer to these three states of shopping as directed shoppers (DS), 
deliberating researchers (DR) and browsers (BR) henceforth. While not necessarily 
perfect, the categorization highlights the most prominent behaviors observed across these 
clusters10. 
Next, we examine the purchase outcomes associated with membership across 
states, which we expect to differ if our labeling of the states was reasonable. We find that 
sessions from directed shoppers had the highest overall proportion of users that both 
added products to the cart (14.49%) and completed the purchase (5.13%), whereas 
sessions from browsers had the lowest overall proportions for both purchase related 
behaviors. Interestingly, we observe that conditional on adding a focal product to the 
shopping cart, browsers had a higher likelihood of completing the purchase (20.2%) than 
deliberating researchers (17.2%), but lower than directed shoppers (35.4%). Further, 
upon examination of customers’ use of tools to refine and screen alternatives, we find 
that customers conducting research were the least likely group to use such decision aids, 
indicating their greater reliance on compensatory choice processes in building their 
consideration sets. Whereas, directed shoppers and browsers displayed greater non-
compensatory search through the use of decision aids to quickly narrow down the 
available assortment. Directed shoppers displayed a high usage of text search to directly 
                                                 
10 Our dataset is limited to customers who visited and/or purchased one of four focal products. In 
characterizing the sessions, we examine the nature of their search behaviors across departments and 
categories to measure the extent to which their search was focused or dispersed. Thus, irrespective of 
whether these customers purchased a focal product or another product, their classification would still 




find products they wanted, and also were most likely to use the product comparison 
matrix which allows users to side-by-side compare up to 4 chosen products.  
In related past work, Gupta and Chintagunta (1994) used demographic variables 
to determine consumers’ segment membership in an offline context. However, with the 
availability of micro-level search behaviors, we believe that using measures such as 
breadth, depth and intensity of online search during a visit /session will better describe 
consumers’ latent heterogeneity in shopping needs and goals. Moreover, using the 
variables in UVOH provides (online retailers) an actionable strategy to profile segments 
since these variables are measurable using clickstream data whereas demographic 
variables are typically unavailable to online durable good retailers. 
 Next, we examine the coefficients of information on the number of purchase 
completion pages visited by the user in a session. These coefficients are of primary 
interest in our study and are presented in Table 2.3b. In column (1) are the results 
obtained from the mixture model that uses the count of purchase completion pages visited 
by the user as the outcome. We also estimate additional session-level models using the 
categorization of sessions obtained from mixture modeling and a full set of controls 
including month, time of day, product type, counts of various types of pages viewed 
(error, store, home etc) and use of tools and decision aids (facets, comparison matrices, 
UGC) as described earlier. In column (2) the outcome is 	_ while in column 
(3) it is 	. The main results that we observe in Table 2.3b are the following. 
Product information had the strongest positive impact on purchase outcomes for 
deliberating researchers, followed by browsers, and had little to a negative impact on 




types of customers – with the largest impact on directed shoppers followed by browsers. 
Specific price information had positive impacts on directed shoppers and browsers, while 
it had a negative influence on deliberating researchers.  
Finally, we assess the transitions between the latent states uncovered by the 
mixture model for cookies with multiple or return visits as displayed in Table 2.4. We 
observe a high level of inertia for directed buyers (66%) and information gatherers 
(63%), where consumers are likely to continue in the same state. For browsers, the 
likelihood of returning as a browser is close to 50% and as a deliberating researcher is 
41%. 
 
2.5. Cookie level model of purchase behavior 
In this section, we develop a random-effects cookie-level panel model that allows 
us to examine both the within-session and across-session influence of online product and 
price information. Within-session refers to the impact of information obtained in a 
session on purchasing in the same session, while across-session refers to the impact of 
information obtained in a session on purchasing (and purchase-relevant behaviors) in 
future session(s). The panel specification allows us to account for two forms of 
heterogeneity. The first is cookie-level unobserved heterogeneity which is stable within a 
cookie and time-invariant across its sessions, modeled using random effects. Additionally 
sessions from a cookie may belong to different latent states of shopping across repeat 
visits. This time-variant heterogeneity is modeled using session-level dummies to 




While it is possible to allow all covariates to differ in their impacts on the 
propensity to purchase across the three latent states of shopping, we are only primarily 
interested in the effects of online information. Therefore, we focus on characterizing 
these varied impacts of online information through the use of interactions between them 
and the three states- DS, DR, and BR. We also include dummies to represent the state of 
the preceding session (if any). This allows us to track consumers as they change their 
state over time and examine the effects of state transition patterns on purchase outcomes. 
Lastly, the across-session impacts of online information are estimated from consumers 
who make repeat visits to the retailers’ website. We include measures of accumulated 
exposure to price and product information (across past sessions that are observed by us) 
and examine their impacts purchase outcomes in the current visit. 
Next, we describe the model setup for our primary outcome – the binary measure 
	.  
2.5.1 Model 
2Hzw 1  /{Tz/MN<OP;NHz′  |L/MN< Q /{TzR/MHSKOP;NHz′  |LRLMHSK
Q /{TzD/MHSKOP;NHz′ |LDLMHSK Q /{Tz}{MzHz′ |L}{Mz
Q /MN<OP;NHz′  |LMN< Q R/MHSKOP;NHz′  |TLMHSK Q D/MHSKOP;NHz′  |BLMHSK
Q h~R~HzAF′  |Lh{zTz{zK Q h~R~Hz′  |{zTz{zK
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Hz 1 H Q  Hz                    
|L/MN<, |LRLMHSK, |LDLMHSK are the coefficients of online information accumulated in past 
sessions 
|L}{Mz is the coefficient of the number of cart adds in past sessions 
|LMN<, |TLMHSK, |BLMHSKare the coefficients of online information obtained in the current 
session 
|Lh{zTz{zK are the dummies that represent the (latent) state of the immediately previous 
session 
 |{zTz{zK are the dummies to represent the (latent) state of the current session 
 |HP;Nw{zTz{zK are the coefficients for the interactions between information and latent state  
|W<H are the coefficients of the breadth, depth and intensity variables  
|I are the coefficients for observed session-level control variables including month, time 
of day, product type, counts of various types of pages viewed (error, store, home etc) and 
use of tools and decision aids (facets, comparison matrices, UGC) as described earlier. 
 
[ is the unobserved cookie-level individual random effect which is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the covariates. These individual effects are distributed H ~ k`, c 
. 
[ is the i.i.d. random error term; Hz ~ k `, c
 and represents unobservables that are 
uncorrelated across sessions and cookies. The variance of [ is given by {MHz
 1
 c 1 c Q c  and SNHz, HT 
 1  c  if the sessions belong to the same cookie or 
consumer (irrespective of the time lag between sessions), and 0 otherwise. The variance 




individual consumer level component of the error term is given by the intragroup 
correlation coefficient 
 1 cc 1
c
c  c 1   
c
c  F                     (8) 
Let z contain the covariates in equation (8), then the probability of observing the given 
outcome conditional on the cookie random effect is given by 
lm2Hz | Hz , H
 1  @Hz′ | Q HCc2Hz 6 F
                (9) 
The likelihood for each unit given is given below  
hH 1 lm@2HF, 2Hc,…,2HC 1  ∞A∞ HF, Hc , … H| H
  H
 H               (10) 
Since the dependence between [’s is attributable to the shared variation in [ (due to the 
assumed independence between [  [), the need to integrate across a T-variate 
normal distribution is eliminated. By conditioning on [ , we integrate them out of the 
likelihood and evaluate the one-dimensional integral in (10) by using Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature (Greene 1997, p.190). The Log-likelihood of the model described in (8)-(10) 
is given by: 
hh 1  ∑ ∑ 2Hz Pz  @Hz′ |CH Q F 6 2Hz
 ij F 6  @Hz′ |C
                                      (11) 
2.5.2 Results   
The results from the cookie-panel model are presented in Table 2.5. We include 
dummy variables to capture the effects of sessions belonging to one of the three latent 
states of shopping. In columns (1)-(3), we present the coefficient estimates for the partial 
models with step-wise additions of the interaction terms between the three states of 




information types. The full model is presented in column (4), and is the one we use. We 
discuss the results from Tables 2.5-2.6 below11.  
States of shopping: The mean purchase likelihood for directed shoppers in the 
sample is given by the constant in Table 2.5, and by a linear combination of the constant 
and the respective latent state dummy for deliberating researchers (x	_ 
 and 
browsers (x	_ 
 when all other covariates are held at their mean (or median for 
binary variables). That purchase is a rare event in our data is reflected in the negative 
coefficients for all three states of shopping, with the highest rate for directed buyers and 
the lowest rate for browsers. On average, we note that directed shoppers had the highest 
rate of conversion at 5.12%, followed by 1.80% for researchers and 1.29% for browsers, 
controlling for covariates. 
 State transitions: Next, we examine the impact of state transitions across sessions 
for repeat visitors. In this analysis, the baseline consists of sessions without a past state - 
they are the first visit for that cookie in our data. As seen in Table 2.5, the coefficient of 
x	_ is negative, while the coefficients of x	_  and 
x	_  are positive and significant. Thus, returning to shop after being in a 
directed buying state had a significant negative effect, while returning to shop after 
having been in either deliberating or browsing states had significant positive effects on 
the likelihood of purchase. Sessions abandoned by directed shoppers are thus a costly loss 
- when these customers leave without purchasing, their likelihood of doing so when they 
return is significantly lowered. This result suggests that retailers should focus on trying to 
convert directed shoppers in the current session itself. In Table 2.6, we examine further 
                                                 
11 We also ran a fixed effect model which was limited only to cookies with multiple sessions. We obtain 




details to help understand the impacts of transitioning between latent states of shopping. 
We find that among directed shoppers that do return, the likelihood to complete the 
purchase drops sharply. If they return as researchers, this conversion rate is 4.57%, 
whereas it drops to 3.52% and 2.70% respectively when they return as directed shoppers 
and browsers. On the other hand, when consumers’ transition into the directed state of 
shopping after being in the other two states the results are optimistic. For instance, for 
sessions where consumers transition from deliberation and research to directed shopping, 
the purchase likelihood jumps to 34.83% and for sessions where consumers proceed to 
directed buying after browsing, this number improves to 29.41%. Overall, for 
deliberating researchers and browsers we find that transitions to the directed state of 
buying had the highest likelihood of converting in the next session, followed by 
transitioning to researching and last, browsing.  
 Past online information: We turn our attention to the impacts of online 
information accumulated from past (but not the current) sessions or visits to the retailer. 
In Table 2.5, the coefficient of  is positive and significant, while the 
coefficients of 	 and 	 are negative, with only the effect 
of 	 significant. Among the three types of information, the cumulative 
effects of product information obtained in earlier sessions had a positive impact on a 
consumers’ likelihood of purchasing in a given session. By contrast, the accumulated 
effects of category specific price promotions and to a lesser extent generic price 
promotions obtained in the past sessions had a negative effect on purchase in a given 
session. This finding highlights the potential negative future effects of promotions when 




 Current online information: To examine the contemporaneous or within-session 
purchase impacts of information obtained by a consumer during the session itself, we 
need to assess not only the three main-effect coefficients of information but also the 
interactions with consumers belonging to different latent states of shopping. For ease of 
understanding and comparison, these coefficients are calculated from the estimates 
displayed in column (4) in Table 2.5 and provided in Table 2.7.  
 Product information ) had the strongest impact on within-session 
purchase for deliberating researchers, followed by browsers. Consumers who are 
conducting research, gathering information and deliberating about a product category are 
the ones that display the greatest positive response to the information contained in 
product buying and use guides, how-to documents, and multimedia demonstrations of 
product features. This provides empirical confirmation of an intuitive result. Product 
information provides the information necessary to assess and compare the products 
available within a category, thereby allowing customers conducting researching for an 
impending purchase to form their preferences. The impact on browsers is interesting. We 
find that product information had a positive impact on customers who were not 
necessarily focused on the particular category, suggesting that such information may have 
attracted customers to a product category. Browsing customers who may have had a 
general interest in the product category but not necessarily considering a near-term 
purchase and received product information appeared to purchase more often than 
browsers who did not receive product information.  
 In contrast to the impact on deliberating and browsing customers, product 




presented to directed buyers. The negative effect on directed buyers is surprising. One 
possible explanation is that receiving detailed product information at this stage creates 
ambivalence or distraction when such information contradicts consumers’ original 
impressions or preferences, especially if it highlights product-relevant aspects that the 
consumer may have overlooked or ignored before. Some past works have found that 
under certain circumstances, the use of decision tools and recommendation agents in 
online settings may provide suggestions that are counter to the preferences of users, 
thereby causing negative reactance (e.g., Fitzsimons and Lehmann 2004). We expect that 
such reactions might have caused directed buyers to delay (or abandon) their purchase 
upon obtaining product related information. Unlike browsers who have most likely not 
engaged in behaviors that create a commitment to purchase, directed buyers have in the 
recent past invested active time and effort (perhaps elsewhere) in considering the 
purchase. Thus obtaining product related information in the form of help and buying 
guides, and multimedia demonstrations appears to distract the latter type of buyer, while 
it attracts the former.  
 Category specific price information (	
 had significant positive 
impacts on both directed shoppers and browsers, leading them to convert more often than 
in its absence. Consumers who display directed behaviors at a website are typically 
highly focused on a product category, and have usually completed their product research 
and have narrowed down their consideration sets and are not seeking more product-
related information (Moe 2003). Such consumers may price-shop across retailers as they 
look for deals or promotions on the specific product(s) that they are considering. 




purchase from the said retailer. Browsers, on the other hand, are likely to convert upon 
receiving promotion related information if they consider the purchase price to be an 
attractive deal. Unlike directed buyers, browsers displayed a broader interest across 
product departments and categories during their session – suggesting that while they were 
interested in the focal product and its category, they may not have been actively seeking 
out related information. Obtaining price information on an attractive promotion or sale in 
a focal product category may therefore serve to generate interest and influence consumers 
to respond with an impulse purchase. In some cases, an impulse purchase may be driven 
because the browsing customer encounters information that stimulates their memory and 
reminds them about a product(s) that he/she had planned long before to purchase but had 
postponed or delayed it while awaiting to gather more information (perhaps about sales). 
 Interestingly, specific price information did not induce similar effects on 
deliberating researchers, and had a negative effect on their purchase behavior. This 
appears counter-intuitive at first, but to see why recall that these consumers are still 
conducting research and deliberating about and forming consideration sets. Specific price 
information increases the attractiveness of all products within a focal product category, 
and does not change or alter the relative attractiveness of product alternatives. Obtaining 
information about a category price promotion improves the valuation of all products in a 
category, but this increased attractiveness of products might also mean that more 
alternatives now satisfy the feasibility constraints of a shopper. Thus, rather than help the 
customer  move closer to making a purchase; in fact specific price information may delay 
their decision-making by increasing the number of alternatives whose (sale price 




 Consider a shopper with a budget constraint, who is still researching product 
alternatives (and has not determined a desired product). Learning about an x% off 
discount in a focal category might now additionally make other alternatives attractive that 
were deemed too expensive in the absence of such a promotion, thereby increasing the 
choice or consideration set. Such a process might lead consumers to inaction or deferral 
of decisions, and has been observed in a variety of laboratory settings (e.g.,Chernev 
2003; Dhar 1997; Dhar and Simonson 2003; Gourville and Soman 2005; Iyengar and 
Lepper 2000) and real world online settings (e.g., Nunes and Boatwright 2001). Broadly 
these studies find that consumers delay a purchase when required to negotiate difficult 
trade-offs between alternatives. Adding more alternatives to the choice set caused choice 
overload, increased choice conflict and resulted in choice deferral. The deferral was 
observed to be greater when the assortment considered by the consumer was increased to 
include alternatives that were non-alignable (Chernev 2003; Gourville and Soman 2005). 
This is likely to happen when, for example, more appliances fall into a consumer’s 
feasible set of alternatives, but they include machines that vary in the availability of 
features or attributes, thereby making comparison among them more difficult for the 
consumer. Thus, encountering larger selections can actually reduce purchases within a 
given product category (Gourville and Soman 2005). Overall, this finding suggests that 
for consumers in the deliberation and research state, price or promotion related 
information by itself is insufficient to motivate them to complete the purchase. They are 
instead likely to continue researching and gathering valuable knowledge about the 




 Generic price information 	) or promotions related to shipping fees 
tended to have across-the-board positive impacts on consumer sessions belonging to all 
three states, suggesting that shipping offers continue to be highly valued by online 
buyers. In other words, the absence of free shipping or related promotions appears to 
lower the purchase likelihood for all consumers. This result is also supported by recent 
studies conducted by PayPal and comScore that found that the leading cause of shopping 
cart abandonment cited by 46% of respondent was high shipping charges12. The strongest 
positive impact of shipping related price offers is interestingly observed for browsers, 
followed by directed shoppers and then researchers. Directed shoppers are those who are 
close to finalizing their purchase and have a deeper commitment to the purchase than 
browsers. This result suggests that directed buyers are less likely than browsers to 
abandon their purchase when a shipping offer is not available. Researchers who have not 
yet completed their evaluations and formed their preferences are only weakly 
(nevertheless significantly) influenced by free shipping offers. 
2.5.3 Additional Analyses Using a Restricted Sample 
 In order to assess the validity of our results, we reran our model using an 
additional restricted sample as follows. One limitation of using clickstream to study 
consumer’s purchase outcomes is that we cannot ascertain the true intent or motivation of 
consumers. While consumers may have visited a product page sometime during the 
session, it may not translate into true interest in the product and need not suggest that the 
product was considered for purchase by the consumer. We therefore place a stronger 
restriction on the customers whose sessions will be included. In this second sample, we 
                                                 




require the customer to have displayed “substantial interest” in one of the focal products 
during at least one of his/her visits to the store. We consider the act of adding a focal 
product to the shopping cart as an indication that the customer is interested in the product, 
and therefore include all sessions from this customer. For other customers who did not 
add a focal product to the shopping cart at any time during our data collection period, we 
include sessions from only those customers who viewed the focal products multiple times 
during at least one of his/her visits to the store (in most cases the focal product was the 
last product to be viewed before the session was abandoned). This results in a sample of 
11,408 sessions from 8,842 unique cookies where some consumers viewed and added the 
focal product to cart, whereas other consumers viewed the focal product and did not add 
to cart but rather abandoned the session afterward. We refer to this as the interested 
sample (as opposed to the full sample), and display the results from the panel purchase 
model in column (5) in Table 2.5. The coefficients of the effects of the information across 
the states of shopping for this restricted sample are calculated and displayed in column 
(2) in Table 7. These results are broadly consistent with column (1) in Table 2.7, and 
engender confidence that our main findings about the effects of information on the 
purchase outcome.   
2.5.4 Tradeoffs Between the Within-Session and Across-Session Impacts of 
Information 
 Together, the results of the influence of three types of information underscore an 
important observation – that there is a tradeoff between the effects of product and price 
related information on purchase outcomes within a session and across sessions. 




alternatives, learning about product features, uses and applications, and has significant 
within-session influence on purchase behaviors for deliberating researchers (and to a 
smaller extent browsers in some models). But it negatively influences the within-session 
conversion of directed shoppers. Exposure to product related information, however, had 
the strongest positive influence on purchase decisions for returning consumers 
irrespective of their state of shopping in previous sessions. On the contrary, both types of 
price information displayed strong positive effects on within-session purchase behaviors 
for customers in two latent states of shopping, but had weak to strong negative impacts 
on purchase for returning customers who abandoned sessions previously. We explore this 
tradeoff further below. 
 In addition to the above demonstrated contrasting effects on purchase that product 
and price information obtained in the past have, we examine whether online information 
influenced consumers who do not purchase to return to visit the online store in the future. 
In Table 2.8, we model the likelihood of a session visitor’s likelihood of returning to visit 
as a function of the online information received in the current session. We specify a panel 
model to control for cookie-level unobservables, and the state of shopping is modeled 
using dummies and interactions as before. 
 For directed shoppers - the group of customers with the highest conversion rate- 
we find the coefficient of price information about discounts in a specific product category 
	
 to be negative. This suggests an interesting tradeoff for 	, 
whereby it has a significant positive effect on helping directed shoppers to complete a 
purchase within a session, but when such a customer does not purchase and leaves 




pattern of tradeoff effects is observed for shipping related information 	 on 
directed shoppers. 
 Deliberating researchers and browsers however experienced a different pattern of 
effects of 	 and 	 on the propensity to return. In Table 2.8, we see 
that the coefficients of 	 are significantly positive for both, while the 
coefficients for 	 are insignificant. Thus, we observe a tradeoff between the 
within-session and across-session impacts of 	 for deliberating researchers, 
but in a direction opposite to that experienced by directed shoppers. Promotion 
information about a specific product category was not useful in converting deliberating 
researchers into purchasers within a given session (in fact it had a negative effect), but it 
increased their likelihood of returning to visit the store.  For browsers, 	 had a 
positive effect on both buying within a session and returning to visit the store. Finally, 
while 	 had across-the-board positive effects on within-session purchase 
behaviors of consumers, it failed to have an effect on influencing abandoning researchers 
and browsers to return to the store. 
 In contrast to these effects of 	 and 	, our results suggest 
that customers belonging to all three states of shopping who obtain and view product 
related information are more likely to return to visit the retailer after they abandon the 
session. This finding is relevant because it highlights the value of  in helping 
engage the customer and in building a relationship with them that extends beyond a given 
session. Given concerns echoed by several retailers about consumers who are price-
sensitive and respond only to price promotions but are typically not loyal and hunt for 




creating a rich product experience for their customers. Product related information helps 
to attract consumers back to the online store, and also has significant impacts on helping 
deliberating researchers (and to a lesser extent browsers in some models) to convert 
within the session. Thus, our study has uncovered some interesting patterns of effects of 
online information on purchase-related behaviors within a session (purchase now) and 
across sessions (likelihood to return and purchase in future). 
2.6. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we conduct additional tests to assess the robustness of our main 
findings related to purchase outcomes (as displayed in Table 2.7) to alternate 
specifications and explanations.  
2.6.1 Endogeneity in Product Information 
	 and 	 are available to all customers in our dataset who 
view the focal product category on the days that the related discount and shipping offers 
were provided by the retailer. However, the impact of  on purchase outcomes 
may suffer from endogeneity bias if consumers who are more likely to purchase were 
also the ones more likely to seek and obtain product-related information. As a first step, 
we compare the means or the proportion of customers in each of the three states that 
obtained information (see Table 2.3). We observe that fewer deliberating researchers, 
who appear to have the strongest positive impact on purchase from , obtained 
product information than directed shoppers, suggesting that endogeneity may not be a 
concern. Yet, in order to more rigorously address the potential for reverse causality, or 




reasons that are also correlated with their purchase outcome, we use the matching method 
to estimate the effects of .   
 The literature on treatment effects defines the treatment effect of a binary 
treatment as the difference in outcome when units (here sessions) are treated (receive 

 and when those same units are not treated. However, we only observe 
sessions in either the treated or the non-treated condition, and therefore must construct 
the necessary missing counterfactuals for the sessions. Propensity score matching allows 
us to estimate average treatment effects by comparing the outcomes of treated and control 
groups that have been matched on the breadth, depth and intensity covariates 
instrumental in determining the likelihood of receiving treatment13. We construct a 
stratified or matched sample of observations that consists of treated and control groups 
that are balanced across these observed covariates – and therefore, on average 
observationally identical. The propensity score is the conditional probability of receiving 
the treatment rather than being part of the control group given the relevant observed 
covariates W (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  It is estimated using a probit model as 
follows where the treatment is  1 1 and W contains variables that describe 
breadth, depth and intensity of search. 
//MN<OP;N 1 F|
 1  
 where Φ is the normal c.d.f.             (12) 
 Matching on such a score serves to simulate random assignment of treatment 
when two conditions hold: a) the observed covariates used to construct the score are 
balanced, and b) there is no bias from unobserved covariates. We check that condition a) 
holds, and we restrict the matching to be performed over the common support region – 
that is using observations whose propensity scores belongs to the intersection of the 
                                                 




supports of the propensity scores of the treated and control sessions. Condition b) is the 
Conditional Independence or Unconfoundedness Assumption that treatment assignment 
is ignorable (independent of the potential binary outcomes for purchase Y(0) or not Y(1) 
in a session) conditional on observed covariates - a critical assumption in matching 
models (Abadie and Imbens 2002). 
/@/MN<OP;N 1 Fs, 0`
, 0F
C 1  //MN<OP;N|
                  (13) 
Identification is achieved when the probability of assignment of treatment is bounded 
away from zero and one, known as the Overlap assumption (Abadie and Imbens 2002): 
` a //MN<OP;N 1 F|
 a 1    
When these regularity conditions hold, then imbalances in pretreatment covariate levels 
can be controlled by adjusting the unidimensional propensity score calculated in (12) 
such that comparisons of outcomes occur between treated and control groups that differ 
only in their exposure to treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The treatment effect 
for an individual *[ is given by 
H 1 / MS{TKH /MN<OP;NH 1 F
 6 / MS{TKH /MN<OP;NH 1 `
    (14) 
 Then aggregate impact of product information on outcomes is calculated as the 
sample average treatment effect on the treated (() given by 
R~ 1  FP ∑ HH\                    (15) 
 Where ¡ 1  ∑ [¢[E£  is the number of treated units for whom the observed 
treatment [ 1 1. An important concern in using propensity score matching 
methods to estimate treatment effects is the potential violation of condition b) above. 
While the model accounts for selection on observables, consumers’ choice to visit online 




unobservables in the study. The results in §3 and §4 suggest that the varied effects of 
several relevant variables (breadth, depth and intensity of search and navigation 
behaviors) on the purchase likelihood are summarily captured in the latent state of 
shopping. If the latent state simultaneously affects assignment into treatment and the 
outcome variable, a hidden bias might arise to which matching estimators are not robust 
(Rosenbaum 2002). Additionally, given our interest in separately identifying the effect of 
(product) information on outcomes across consumer sessions belonging to different latent 
states, we construct propensity score matching estimates for each latent group separately, 
in effect using a latent state dummy as a matching covariate in addition to W. This 
provides us with one way, albeit imperfect, in which to account for unobservables.  
 The results from the propensity score matching analyses limited to consumer 
sessions with a common support are presented in Table 2.9. In column (1), matches are 
found using a caliper or radius matching  1 0.1
 , while in column (2), matching is 
conducted using a block-stratified matching algorithm. The standard errors are calculated 
using bootstrapping procedures.  As observed there, our primary results remain robust. 
The coefficient of  is positive and significant for researchers and browsers, 
whereas for directed shoppers, it continues to be negative to insignificant. 
2.6.2 Price vs. Brand Sensitivity of Consumers 
In §5, the results indicated that consumers belonging to different (latent) states of 
shopping obtained varying benefits from the three types of product and price information.  
In this subsection, we examine an alternate explanation for the consumer purchase 




completed the purchase when provided with price related (vs. product related) 
promotions merely more price-sensitive (or brand/feature-sensitive)?  
An important feature of shopping online is the availability of refining and 
screening tools which offer consumers the ability to alter the products that they see, and 
thereby affect the consideration sets that they build, and the final products that they 
choose to buy. Prior research has found that such decision tools and aids available in 
computer mediated markets can have significant effects on the final choices made by 
customers (e.g., Alba et al. 1997; Haubl and Trifts 2000; Lynch and Ariely 2000). 
Several retailers (including ours) today provide faceted search tools that lets users refine 
or navigate a collection of products by using a number of discrete attributes or facets. We 
are specifically interested in consumers’ use of price (	!			) vs. product 
(!			) attributes to screen alternatives. We use this as a proxy for 
consumers’ price vis-à-vis product sensitivity for purchases in the focal product category, 
and examine whether it influenced the results obtained in Table 2.6. If this were the case, 
we should expect to see that deliberating researchers are more product-sensitive than 
directed buyers; and that directed buyers and browsers are more price-sensitive than 
deliberating researchers.  
We compare the extent of refining and screening (counts) performed by 
consumers during sessions (see Table 2.3). We find that on average, deliberating 
researchers had the lowest counts of product/brand refining (µ= 0.172, s.d. = 1.148), 
followed by browsers (µ = 0.371, s.d. =1.756) and directed buyers (µ = 0.570, s.d. 
=2.879). Deliberating researchers also had the fewest number of price refining counts on 




buyers (µ = 0.579, s.d. = 2.843) had a similar average. Also see figure 2a and 2b for the 
distribution plots.  
Browsers conducted more price-based than feature/brand-based refining and 
screening operations. Directed shoppers were equally likely to refine using both types of 
attributes. As a group, researchers were least likely to use either refining criterion (but 
also relied slightly more on price-based screening). In the results displayed in Table 2.5, 
we controlled for the extent of price vs. product refining conducted by a consumer in a 
session. However, neither type of refining significantly influenced consumers’ likelihood 
to purchase, whereas the coefficients for the states of shopping and information were 
significant14. In order to assess whether the three latent states were masking consumer’s 
price sensitivity, we include interaction terms between the three types of information and 
both types of refining and screening to additionally separate and control for their effects. 
The relevant coefficients for the three types of online information are displayed in Table 
2.10. After controlling for several controls, and the interactions between states and the 
two types of refining/screening, we find that our main results for the effects of 
information obtained within a session and in the past sessions on conversion within the 
session remain consistent with our findings from Table 2.7. 
These observations help mitigate the concern that the influence of product and 
price information merely coincide with corresponding product-price sensitivity of 
consumers in the focal product category. While price-sensitivity appeared to explain 
some of the findings related to the effect of specific and generic price information on 
shoppers, after controlling for the former, the latent state of shopping that the consumer 
                                                 
14 However, we cannot entirely rule out this possibility since the extent of product and price –based refining and 





belonged to continued to remain significant and determined whether product or price 
related information influenced shoppers to complete their purchase. 
2.6.3 Adding to the Shopping Cart 
In this subsection, we extend our analysis to examine the impacts of information 
on an important intermediate or pre-purchase outcome- adding products to the shopping 
cart. This analysis seeks to shed light on whether product and price information influence 
shopping cart abandonment- which is a common woe of online retailers (c.f., Murthi and 
Sarkar 2003) - differently for the three states. 
We found evidence of such a behavior in Table 2.4 earlier when we described the 
states and observed different conditional rates of purchase. We examine this more 
carefully here in Table 2.11 using a panel model for both the full sample (col 1) and the 
interested sample (col 2). The impacts of information on adding products to the cart are 
jointly estimated but separately displayed for each group – the results are largely 
consistent with our purchase model in §5. Deliberating researchers were more likely to 
add a product to the shopping cart upon retrieving relevant product information; whereas 
both directed shoppers and browsers were more likely to do so when they received either 
type of price-related (sales and shipping) information. This result is interesting because it 
suggests that the same type of information influences customers in a given shopping state 
to both add the product to the shopping cart and complete the purchase. This is counter to 
the belief that once customers have added products to the shopping cart, only price 





We assess the relationship between the two outcomes 	 and  using a 
bivarite model that allows us to jointly estimate the effects of covariates across these two. 
The mean correlation between the standard errors across the two outcomes is estimated to 
be 0.9935 ¤¥1
 1  304.98,  1 0.00
 - this high number indicates that there is high 
level of similarity in the unobservables that affect a consumer’s decision to perform both 
outcomes. We calculate the predicted probabilities after controlling for the distribution 
and impacts of several relevant covariates (as used in table 2.5). At a joint predicted 
probability Pr	[ 1 1, [ 1 1
 of 4.44%, the conversion rate is the highest 
for directed buyers followed by information gatherers (1.73%) and browsers (1.30%). 
The groups were ranked in the same order for the marginal predicted probabilities of both 
outcomes - adding to the shopping cart and completing the purchase. However the 
conditional probability Pr	[ 1 1 | [ 1 1
 1  P¬­®¯°±²³´µE£,¶²¯µE£
P¬¶²¯µE£
   tells a 
different story. Conditional on having added products to the shopping cart, directed 
buyers had the highest probability of completing the purchase (35.35%), while 
information gatherers had the lowest (18.80%). This suggests that consumers across the 
different segments perhaps use the shopping cart for different reasons. Deliberating 
researchers, who add to the cart at a comparatively higher rate than browsers, are 
however less likely to complete the purchase. The low conditional rate of conversion of 
shopping carts for researchers underscores the importance of recognizing that some 
consumers may not be ready to purchase in the current session even if they add products 
to their cart. They may be using the cart to conveniently hold and compare chosen 






We began this study with the goal of determining how firms and retailers should 
manage the provision of online price and product-related information to customers who 
are actively visiting their online store.  We specifically examined whether customers to 
an online retail store were distinguishable by their observable search and navigation 
behaviors accessed through the clickstream that they generate. Following the derivation 
of a segmentation of customer sessions, more appropriately termed states of shopping in 
our study, we assessed whether three types of commonly available information 
differently influenced purchase outcomes across the states. 
Our main results are the following. When focusing on conversion within a 
session, both browsers and directed shoppers are best influenced by price-related 
information (discounts, sales, free shipping etc.). However, customers who are 
deliberating and conducting research responded best to product-related information. In 
our sample, we observed that the sessions where customers were deliberating formed the 
largest group, slightly greater than sessions where the customers were browsing and 
nearly three times larger than the sessions where the customers were directly buying. This 
suggests that online retailers have a large potential ability to induce online customers to 
convert using rich product information if they are able to identify and target the customer 
when he or she is deliberating and researching the available alternatives in a focal product 
category.  By persuading deliberating researchers to complete the purchase within a 
session, the retailer reduces the need to have to attract them using price levers when they 




and free shipping offers to the customers in states that obtain the greatest value from 
price-related information, and more importantly might have abandoned the session in 
their absence. Thus, by uncovering the unobserved state of the shopper, the retailer can 
appropriately target price vs. product information to the customer, thereby avoiding the 
need to always offer margin-eroding price promotions in order to incentivize customers 
to complete the purchase. In fact, our results highlight the surprising negative effect of 
category-level price promotions on deliberating researchers. In the other negative effect 
of information, we observed that rich product information distracted directed shoppers 
and anticlimactically led them to delay their purchase. Thus, our within-session results 
shed light on the varied impacts of information across customers and also draw attention 
to the possible undesired consequences of mis-targeted information.  
When examining conversion and purchase-related behaviors across sessions, our 
study suggests that there may be important tradeoffs in the impacts of information on 
purchasing within a session as compared to influencing customers to return to purchase 
from the online store in a future session. Irrespective of the shopping state of the 
customer, product related information had a significant positive impact on influencing 
customers who did not purchase in a given session to both return to the store (in the 
short-term) and buy (that particular item) in a future session. Our results highlight the 
important role for product information and its ability to create stickiness in the website 
and loyalty among its customers.  
However, both types of price related information – that had a positive impact on 
within-session conversion - appeared to have unfavorable or negative impacts on the 




shoppers receive price or promotion information, but fail to find price sufficiently 
attractive to purchase and therefore abandon the session, they are less likely to return to 
the store in the short-term for that particular item. Price information on discounts in a 
specific product category, however, appeared to have positive effects on the likelihood to 
return to visit (but not necessarily buy) for deliberating researchers and browsers. Thus 
specific price information might have aided customers to progress farther along the 
shopping cycle. Finally, free shipping – that had broad positive impacts on within-session 
conversion for all three states of shopping - failed to have a positive impact on 
influencing customers in all three states to revisit the store.   
These tradeoffs in the effects of product vs. price information within and across 
sessions is an important finding that our model uncovers due to our ability to not only 
link customers across sessions but more importantly, track the accumulation of content 
that they view as they make multiple visits to the online retailer. This allows us to tease 
apart the effects of information obtained within a given session from the effects of 
information obtained in past visits. Our findings have relevant implications for online 
firms, which we discuss next. 
2.7.2 Implications 
While firms have traditionally had limited and often static opportunities to 
interact with consumers, the fast-changing environment of electronic retailing is 
essentially changing this. The availability of micro-level consumer behavior data 
promises to bring online retailers closer to achieving truly customized interactions with 
their customers (Alba et al. 1997; Ansari and Mela 2003; Hoffman and Novak 1996).  




point for segmenting sessions from relatively anonymous customers in meaningful ways, 
and determining the optimal provision of product and price information to these different 
types of customers. In the absence of identifying information that is typically available in 
offline channels and for frequently purchase goods, durable good retailers have to devise 
alternate ways to distinguish their customers. A particularly interesting aspect of our 
study is the use of observed and easily available search and navigation activity on the 
website itself to generate the background covariates required to determine the latent 
shopping state of the customer.  
Our study questions the current common practice of offering promotions such as 
free shipping and product category discounts to all customers that are visiting a store, and 
provide empirical evidence to support this intuition. We argue that this strategy is 
suboptimal and results in retailers providing unnecessary promotions to customers who 
would have purchased anyway. We show that by learning about customers’ latent states 
of shopping, retailers can instead optimally target product and price information to 
customers who are less likely to complete a purchase in the absence of such information, 
thereby increasing the lift created by online information.  
Moreover, depending on the retailer’s goal – immediate conversion in the short 
term, i.e. before the customer ends a session, versus ensuring that the customer develops 
a longer-term relationship with the retailer and returns to the site over time – a different 
information provision strategy is likely to be optimal. This implication is driven by the 
tradeoffs or contrasting effects generated by our model for product and price information 





Our study makes a few important contributions to practice. First, by using in-
session or real-time segmentation and customization strategies it allows retailers to avoid 
the pitfalls surrounding the use of sensitive information about consumers that need to be 
tracked over long periods of time. In the offline channel, retailers have relied on the use 
of demographics (e.g., moms vs. teenagers) and purchase histories (e.g., loyals vs. first-
timers) to segment customers. This limited retailers to develop information targeting 
strategies that were based on static customer characteristics and/or past outcomes, 
whereas, more relevant targeting can be achieved by the use of real-time customer 
behaviors. This allows us to partially overcome the problem of the “gift-shopper” who is 
offered irrelevant promotions for children’s toys when she later tries to search for 
business apparel, for instance. Real-time customization strategies enable retailers to better 
match consumers’ concurrent preferences and lead to positive sales outcomes. 
Second, since historical actions and pre-determined profiles are not always 
needed, these techniques may allow retailers to actively target and interact with even new 
visitors to their web store. Third, our model of targeted information is consistent with 
shifting emphasis from the “static” user model to the “dynamic” behavior model which 
allows for the same consumer to be targeted in different ways on different occasions 
based on changing needs/preferences.  
2.7.4 Limitations and Future Extensions 
Our study adds to a growing stream of research that suggests ways in which firms 
can improve their customer’s online experience by making websites more usable and 




and retailers can aid in consumers' online search and purchase decisions (Novak, 
Hoffman, and Yung 2000; Hauser 2009). Along these lines, our study sheds light on the 
impacts of product and price related information for consumers in different shopping 
states. Our current work is based on a sample observed over a short period that precludes 
us from studying purchases that may have occurred from customers returning beyond our 
observation period. We also group together different kinds of rich product information in 
this work, but it would be useful to tease apart the different effects of buying guides vs. 
other multimedia demonstrations, for instance. This study should also be extended to 
study the effects of user generated content such as reviews that is becoming wildly 
popular in online shopping contexts.  
A modeling limitation of our current study is the separation of the tasks of 
identifying latent states at the session level and estimation of information effects using a 
cookie-panel. While combining them would require us to make several additional 
assumptions about the distribution of unknown parameters (that drive the latent state and 
state transitions) that may not necessarily be realistic, it can help validate the robustness 
of our current findings. In future studies, it will be useful to examine the pathways of 
influence – how product vs. price information differently affects customers’ underlying 
purchase oriented structural parameters. For example, what is the impact of information 
on the buying threshold? Relatedly, when information does not incentivize customers to 
buy, does it help them to progress through the shopping funnel (and advance from being a 
browser to a deliberating researcher to a directed shopper)? Finally, while our current 
work is focused on the impacts of information obtained any time during the session, 




would be complementary, and help firms make even more specific decisions related to 







Table 2.1a. Partial clickstream from a sample user who doesn’t purchase 
 
CookieID SessionID Date/timestamp Page 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 16:52 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>GARDEN CENTER- 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 16:53 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>GARDEN CENTER>CHIPPERS  SHREDDERS  ACCESS.- 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 16:53 PRODUCT: 22 IN. 14.4 VOLT CORDLESS HEDGE HOG HEDGE TRIMMER (100060602) 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 16:53 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>GARDEN CENTER- 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 16:54 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>GARDEN CENTER>POWER TOOLS- 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 17:00 PRODUCT: 200 MPH BLOWER VAC (100055950) 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 17:03 HOME PAGE 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 17:03 CATEGORY: SUPERFEATURES2/MISCELLANEOUS/PM_FALL_CLEANUP_06 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 17:04 CATEGORY: SUPERFEATURES2/OUTDOOR_POWER_EQUIPMENT/KH_BLOWERS_BUYING_GUIDE 
4.00E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 17:08 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>GARDEN CENTER- 
 
 
Table 2.1b. Partial clickstream from a sample user who completes a purchase 
CookieID SessionID Date/timestamp Page 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:23 SEARCH:BASIC 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:23 CATEGORY: TEXT SEARCH >PATIO SET-CATEGORY>OUTDOOR LIVING- 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:24 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>OUTDOOR LIVING>PATIO FURNITURE> 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:24 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>OUTDOOR LIVING>PATIO FURNITURE> 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:24 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>OUTDOOR LIVING>PATIO FURNITURE - PRICE>$400 - 600- 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:25 PRODUCT: ST. CROIX 5 PC. TILE TOP CHAT GROUP IN FOSSIL (100399316) 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:25 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>OUTDOOR LIVING>PATIO FURNITURE> 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:25 CATEGORY: CATEGORY>OUTDOOR LIVING>PATIO FURNITURE> BRAND>HAMPTON BAY- 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:25 PRODUCT: MISSION BAY 5-PIECE ALUMINUM DINING SET (100397582) 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:25 ITEM ADDED TO CART 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:28 SHOP_CART/PG_ALT_VIEW_POPUP.JSP 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:30 SHOP_CART/PG_DELIVERY_STEP1.JSP 
4.01E+22 1.16E+27 10/15/2006 15:32 SHOP_CART/PG_DELIVERY_STEP2.JSP 




Table 2.2. Examining fit across multi-component models (count outcome)  
# components LL AIC  AIC3 BIC  
1  -8221.305 16466.61 16478.61 16569.99 
2  -8135.561 16321.12 16346.12 16536.49 
3  -8044.895 16165.79 16203.79 16493.15 

















Variable  Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev. 






DeptBreadth  0.337 0.600  0.415 0.602  0.869 0.807 
CatBreadth  1.526 2.949  2.448 4.327  4.369 5.688 
Depth  2.198 1.205  3.330 1.142  2.094 0.871 
TotalPages  30.222 34.326  15.050 14.756  18.692 18.069 
TotalTime  18.435 18.019  9.258 11.884  7.093 8.964 
TotalProducts  4.614 6.283  8.933 3.973  3.180 3.714 
RatioProdtoCatPages  0.794 0.627  0.915 0.962  0.405 0.201 
ProdPagesPerMin  2.118 1.730  2.100 1.621  3.179 1.996 
Repeat session  0.153 0.360  0.110 0.312  0.074 0.262 
Cart  0.145 0.352  0.105 0.306  0.064 0.244 
Buy  0.051 0.221  0.018 0.133  0.013 0.113 
Conditional Buy  0.354 0.478  0.172 0.378  0.202 0.402 
PriceFacetedSearch  0.579 2.843  0.250 1.413  0.555 2.135 
ProdFacetedSearch  0.570 2.879  0.172 1.148  0.371 1.756 
TextSearch  1.524 4.683  0.853 2.789  0.333 1.751 
CompMatrix  0.375 1.604  0.207 1.374  0.131 0.888 
ProdInfo  0.160 0.366  0.098 0.297  0.071 0.257 
SPriceInfo  0.310 0.462  0.284 0.451  0.263 0.440 






Table 2.3b Impacts of information on purchase outcomes in session-level models 
 
Model (1) Purchase_cnt (2) Purchase_cnt (3) Purchase 
Controls Basic Extended Extended 
 
J s.e. J s.e. J s.e. 
Directed shopper 
  
    
ProdInfo -0.007 0.189 -0.156 0.289 -0.396*** 0.111 
SPriceInfo 0.974*** 0.260 1.259*** 0.331 0.508*** 0.136 
GPriceInfo 1.885*** 0.256 1.081* 0.431 0.732*** 0.191 
Deliberating researcher 
  
    
ProdInfo 1.609*** 0.125 1.766*** 0.164 0.447*** 0.079 
SPriceInfo -0.014 0.223 -0.071 0.286 -0.351* 0.142 
GPriceInfo 1.471*** 0.186 0.503 0.381 0.465** 0.168 
Browsers 
  
    
ProdInfo 0.925*** 0.209 1.236*** 0.248 0.233* 0.095 
SPriceInfo 1.258*** 0.340 1.247** 0.383 0.988*** 0.208 
GPriceInfo 2.667*** 0.299 1.485*** 0.472 1.264*** 0.240 
Note: The dependent variable is Purchase_cnt in columns (1) and (2) and binary Purchase in column (3). 
We estimate session level models with cluster robust standard errors.  













     
Directed shopper 65.93% 21.79% 12.28%   904 
Deliberating researcher 9.60% 63.34% 27.06% 1855 
Browser 8.86% 41.25% 49.88% 1343 




Table 2.5. Estimating the within-session and across-session impacts of online information on completing a purchase 
 
 




(3) Full  
sample 




 · s.e. · s.e. · s.e. · s.e. · s.e. 
LatState_DR -0.566*** 0.055 -0.280*** 0.057 -0.540*** 0.081 -0.126 0.147 -0.119 0.178 
LatState_BR -0.612*** 0.062 -0.491*** 0.066 -0.501+ 0.087 -1.025*** 0.225 -1.328*** 0.263 
PastLatState_DS -0.349*** 0.107 -0.333** 0.108 -0.340** 0.109 -0.323** 0.109 -0.445*** 0.122 
PastLatState_DR 0.196* 0.084 0.207* 0.084 0.199* 0.084 0.212* 0.085 0.019+ 0.093 
PastLatState_BR 0.203* 0.089 0.205* 0.090 0.195* 0.089 0.225* 0.090 0.111+ 0.099 
PastProdInfo 0.177*** 0.040 0.184*** 0.039 0.180*** 0.039 0.180*** 0.040 0.175*** 0.043 
PastSPriceInfo -0.392*** 0.095 -0.408*** 0.095 -0.402*** 0.095 -0.401*** 0.095 -0.371*** 0.099 
PastGPriceInfo -0.085+ 0.048 -0.115* 0.048 -0.094* 0.047 -0.115* 0.048 -0.128* 0.051 
PastCart -0.217*** 0.059  -0.235*** 0.059 -0.220*** 0.059 -0.235*** 0.060 -0.250*** 0.066 
ProdInfo -0.344*** 0.102 0.204*** 0.057 0.201*** 0.057 -0.352*** 0.103 -0.465*** 0.122 
SPriceInfo 0.271** 0.099 0.440*** 0.114 0.250* 0.098 0.753*** 0.148 0.997*** 0.179 
GPriceInfo 0.672*** 0.156 0.716*** 0.158 0.604*** 0.169 0.802*** 0.197 0.932*** 0.243 
ProdInfo*DR 0.792*** 0.119     0.821*** 0.120 0.868*** 0.143 
ProdInfo*BR 0.664*** 0.134     0.672*** 0.135 0.739*** 0.161 
SPriceInfo*DR   -0.650*** 0.118   -1.012*** 0.179 -1.282*** 0.211 
SPriceInfo*BR   0.053 0.108   0.433+ 0.238 0.498+ 0.277 
GPriceInfo*DR     0.202* 0.098 -0.365* 0.155 -0.534** 0.188 
GPriceInfo*BR     0.033 0.102 0.440+ 0.229 0.539* 0.267 
           
CatBreadth 0.003 0.018 0.002 0.018 0.001 0.018 0.005 0.018 0.053* 0.022 
DeptBreadth -0.161*** 0.025 -0.169*** 0.025 -0.166*** 0.025 -0.166*** 0.025 -0.244*** 0.030 
Depth 0.150*** 0.026 0.158*** 0.026 0.157*** 0.026 0.150*** 0.026 0.257*** 0.030 
TotalPages  0.104* 0.042 0.105* 0.042 0.101* 0.042 0.110** 0.042 0.043 0.053 
TotalPages^2  0.000 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TotalTime  0.287*** 0.031 0.296*** 0.031 0.300*** 0.030 0.279*** 0.031 0.235*** 0.038 
TotalTime^2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TotalProducts 0.307*** 0.049 0.324*** 0.049 0.313*** 0.048 0.324*** 0.049   
ProdPagesPerMin -0.054 0.040 -0.055 0.040 -0.056 0.040 -0.052 0.040 -0.114** 0.051 
OrdSession 0.517*** 0.071 0.517*** 0.070 0.509*** 0.070 0.527*** 0.071 0.482*** 0.077 
OrdSession^2 -0.048*** 0.009 -0.046*** 0.009 -0.047*** 0.009 -0.047*** 0.009 -0.040*** 0.009 
           
PriceFacetedSearch -0.006 0.016 -0.008 0.016 -0.006 0.016 -0.008 0.016 -0.004 0.020 
ProdFacetedSearch 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.020 
TextSearch 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.016 




           
HomePage 0.035 0.039 0.033 0.039 0.035 0.039 0.031 0.039       0.094+ 0.050 
StorePages 0.071*** 0.020 0.064*** 0.020 0.063*** 0.020 0.073*** 0.020 0.093*** 0.024 
ExternalPages 0.104 0.065 0.105 0.064 0.100 0.065 0.113+ 0.065 0.160+ 0.083 
UGCReviews 0.304** 0.107 0.311** 0.107 0.315** 0.106 0.299** 0.107 0.373** 0.138 
AccountPages 0.174*** 0.032 0.176*** 0.032 0.174*** 0.032 0.177*** 0.032 0.166*** 0.038 
ErrorPages -0.195*** 0.053 -0.185*** 0.053 -0.186*** 0.053 -0.197*** 0.053 -0.215*** 0.062 
Intercept -2.542*** 0.388 -2.748*** 0.389 -2.605*** 0.388 -2.725*** 0.404 -0.998* 0.507 
           
¸¹ 0.518 0.031 0.517 0.031 0.518 0.031 0.517 0.031 0.537 0.046 º 0.212 0.020 0.211 0.020 0.212 0.020 0.211 0.020 0.224 0.030 
           
Note: The dependent variable across all models is Purchase. We estimate cookie-panel models with cluster robust standard errors. Col (1)-(4) use the 
full sample, while col (5) uses the interested sample. 
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 










Previous state  
   
 
 
   
Directed shopper  3.52% 4.57% 2.70% 
Deliberating researcher  34.83% 2.72% 4.18% 
Browser  29.41% 4.33% 3.88% 
 
 
   






Table 2.7.  Impacts of information obtained within a session on completing a 
purchase  
 
Information obtained  
 (1) Full sample  (2) Interested sample 
 J s.e.  J s.e. 
Directed shopper  
  
   
ProdInfo  -0.352*** 0.103  -0.465*** 0.122 
SPriceInfo  0.753*** 0.148  0.997*** 0.179 
GPriceInfo  0.802*** 0.197  0.932*** 0.243 
Deliberating researcher  
  
   
ProdInfo  0.469*** 0.077  0.402*** 0.091 
SPriceInfo  -0.259* 0.127  -0.285+ 0.149 
GPriceInfo  0.437* 0.169  0.398+ 0.214 
Browsers  
  
   
ProdInfo  0.319*** 0.098  0.274* 0.115 
SPriceInfo  1.187*** 0.203  1.495*** 0.236 




   
Note: The dependent variable is Purchase. We estimate cookie-panel models with cluster robust standard 
errors. Col(1)uses the full sample, while col (2) uses the interested sample. 
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 




(2) Full sample  (2) Interested sample 
J s.e.  J s.e. 
Directed shopper 
  
   
ProdInfo 0.434*** 0.082  0.368** 0.143 
SPriceInfo -1.532*** 0.072  -1.464*** 0.130 
GPriceInfo -1.836*** 0.105  -2.362*** 0.247 
Deliberating researcher 
  
   
ProdInfo 0.295*** 0.078  0.297* 0.136 
SPriceInfo 0.186** 0.060  0.346*** 0.098 
GPriceInfo -0.166 0.094  -0.616** 0.230 
Browsers 
  
   
ProdInfo 0.168* 0.080  0.160* 0.071 
SPriceInfo 0.123* 0.057  0.225* 0.099 
GPriceInfo -0.066 0.094  -0.509* 0.229 
¸¹ 0.243   0.352  º 0.056 
 
 0.110  
   
   
Note: The dependent variable is likelihood to return visit. We estimate cookie-panel models with cluster 
robust standard errors. Col (1) uses the full sample, while col (2) uses the interested sample. The models 




Table 2.9. The impact of product information using matching techniques 
 




Radius matching      
All 3883 2389 0.026 0.004 7.094 
Directed shopper 932 502 -0.014 0.009 -1.687 
Deliberating researcher 1724 1085 0.041 0.006 6.950 
Browser 1227 782 0.021 0.006 3.816 
Stratified matching      
All 3883 36853 0.032 0.004 8.559 
Directed shopper 932 4506 -0.025 0.014 -1.796 
Deliberating researcher 1724 14525 0.048 0.006 8.234 





Figure 2.1a. Distribution of the use of PriceFacetedSearch (count) across latent 
states 
 

































































































Table 2.10. Impacts of information on purchase controlling for price-product 
sensitivity  
Information obtained  (1) Full sample  
 
 · s.e.  
PAST SESSIONS      
Past_ProdInfo  0.179*** 0.040  
Past_SPriceInfo  -0.391*** 0.095  
Past_GPriceInfo  -0.122* 0.048  
Past_AddtoCart  -0.235*** 0.060  
WITHIN SESSION: Directed shopper     
ProdInfo  -0.306* 0.127  
SPriceInfo  0.559** 0.178  
GPriceInfo  0.301** 0.108  
WITHIN SESSION: Deliberating researcher     
ProdInfo  0.684** 0.051  
SPriceInfo  -0.456** 0.168  
GPriceInfo  -0.092 0.193  
WITHIN SESSION: Browser     
ProdInfo  0.080 0.069  
SPriceInfo  1.043*** 0.222  
GPriceInfo  0.812** 0.260  
Note: The dependent variable is Purchase. We estimate cookie-panel models with cluster robust standard 
errors. The models contain the three types of information, past latent state, current latent state and their 
interactions with information, the two types of price and product faceted search and their interactions with 
latent states.  *** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
Table 2.11.  Impacts of information on adding to the shopping cart 
Information obtained  (1) Full sample  (2)    Interested sample 
 
 · s.e.  · s.e. 
PAST SESSIONS       
Past_ProdInfo  -0.024 0.032  0.028 0.035 
Past_SPriceInfo  -0.190** 0.062  -0.151* 0.067 
Past_GPriceInfo  -0.212*** 0.039  -0.152*** 0.042 
Past_AddtoCart  0.428*** 0.046  0.220*** 0.050 
WITHIN SESSION: Directed shopper       
ProdInfo  0.041 0.072  -0.258** 0.098 
SPriceInfo  0.493*** 0.149  0.664** 0.211 
GPriceInfo  0.285** 0.097  0.427** 0.139 
WITHIN SESSION: Deliberating researcher       
ProdInfo  0.684*** 0.051      0.639*** 0.069 
SPriceInfo  0.208 0.131  0.340+ 0.190 
GPriceInfo  0.038 0.065  0.140 0.097 
WITHIN SESSION: Browsers       
ProdInfo  0.080 0.069  0.017 0.091 
SPriceInfo  0.649*** 0.140      0.939*** 0.204 
GPriceInfo  0.567*** 0.083      0.851*** 0.126 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicating whether the customer added a focal product to the 
shopping cart during the session. We estimate cookie-panel models with cluster robust standard errors. The 








Over the recent years the growth of the Internet has dramatically increased the information 
available to prospective buyers across a number of markets. In contrast to traditional settings 
where information was mostly obtained from a few centralized/institutional sources 
(typically the seller or a third-party), consumers today have access to information from a 
multitude of avenues. The Web allows consumers to avail of product and pricing-related 
information in greater detail and depth, while also providing ways to seek distributed advice 
from experts and information intermediaries. In addition, consumers have access to user 
generated content, online word of mouth, product reviews/recommendations, and seller 
ratings – sources that have garnered appreciable interest recently. Consumers benefit from 
this rich diversity of online information as they engage in pre-purchase search across several 
product categories on the Internet (Schadler and Golvin 2005), with over 50% of online 
consumers reporting that their purchase decisions were significantly influenced by online 
content (iProspect Report 2007).  While it is widely acknowledged that the growing 
decentralization of information and increased access to such collective intelligence will bring 
about fundamental transformations in the way firms and consumers transact, there have been 
few systematic studies examining the implications of these changes for consumers as well as 
marketers.  Our study seeks to address this issue by examining how different types of online 
information obtained by consumers affects their value for certification in a market with 




As is well known, markets with significant information asymmetries - particularly 
markets for used goods - have traditionally resorted to quality-signaling mechanisms such as 
certification, warranties, brand, and seller reputation (Dewally and Ederington 2003), to help 
reduce frictions and the likelihood of market collapse (Akerlof 1970).  Such quality signals 
have been considerably valuable for consumers in these markets, with consumers often 
paying a premium for them. However, the value of the quality signal to consumers, and the 
competitive advantage it provides to sellers, depends crucially on the nature and extent of 
information asymmetries present in the market. With the growth of purchase-related 
websites, it is possible that the use of product- and price-related online information may alter 
the information gap between buyers and sellers in used-good markets. This brings to the fore 
several questions relevant to markets where consumers have traditionally relied on signals 
from centralized sources to mitigate purchase frictions. Of particular interest to firms is 
whether consumers’ increased use of decentralized online information substitutes or 
complements traditional mechanisms such as certification.  Specifically, we examine how the 
access to online information alters the salience and value of certification for consumers. For 
instance, with greater online information, are consumers more likely to purchase the quality 
signal or certification? Do consumers who obtain certain types of online information pay 
higher or lower prices than others for their purchases?  
The used-vehicle market provides the context for our study. Given the complexity of 
the offerings and the difficulty in determining quality, certification in particular has played a 
valuable role in reducing frictions in the market for used cars. In recent times, the Internet 
and the emergence of auto-retailing websites have however dramatically increased the 




landscape of used vehicle markets makes it an ideal setting to understand the impact of 
online information on the value of certification – an issue of interest to academicians as well 
as practitioners. We draw upon a unique and extensive dataset of consumers who report on 
their acquisition of different types of online information used in their recent used vehicle 
purchase. The availability of rich accounts of consumers' information search along with 
transaction details allows us to examine the impact of online information on consumers' 
choice of certified used cars, as well as the price paid. We develop a simple model motivated 
by theory and empirical observations from economics and behavioral decision research to 
explain the impacts of online information. We compare the outcomes of sales where 
consumers purchased certified used cars with sales of non-certified used-cars, after 
controlling for a number of buyer, vehicle, and market characteristics. We find that four 
different types of online information - comparative product information, comparative price 
information, vehicle- specific product information, and transaction-specific price information 
- have significant but varied impacts on consumers' value for certification. Our results 
highlight the important role of online information for buyer and seller outcomes in markets 
for used goods. Based on their impact on the demand and the price paid for certified as well 
as uncertified cars, we find that both specific and comparative price information 
complements certification, while specific and comparative product-related information 
substitute certification. As highlighted later, these findings have significant implications for 
manufacturers and retailers seeking to leverage the growing power of the Web as well as for 
third-party information providers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §2 describes the context of our study as 




discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the study and offer hypotheses on the impacts of four 
types of online information on the value of certification in §3. We present details of the 
empirical study including the data, measures and model in §4, followed by our results in §5. 
§6 concludes with a discussion of the relevance of our findings for buyers, sellers, and online 
infomediaries in secondary markets, and suggestions for future work. 
3.2. Research Context and Related Works 
The used car market is a large and significant one, and has been growing at a phenomenal 
pace. While 16.5 million new vehicles were purchased in North America in 2006, the 
corresponding numbers for used vehicles was 44 million (Manheim 2007). In this classic 
“lemons” market (Akerlof 1970), sellers use different mechanisms to signal the quality of 
their products.  
3.2.1 Certification 
The most popular of these quality signaling mechanisms is “certification”, which 
emerged as a byproduct of leasing in the late 1980s and 1990s when luxury car 
manufacturers and dealers sought to resell vehicles whose lease periods had ended.  
Certification implies that the certified vehicle has been put through a comprehensive 
inspection process15. These certified pre-owned (CPO) vehicles have increasingly become an 
important category of vehicle purchases. J. D. Power and Associates (2006) estimates that the 
sale of certified cars (1.6 million in 2006) had increased 46% since 2000, and accounts for 
over 40% of all used car sales. However, an interesting and crucial aspect of vehicle 
certification is that, unlike situations where certification is generally provided by independent 
                                                 
15 National Automobile Dealers’ Association classifies certification inspections as: general evaluation; under-





third-parties, guidelines for used car certification is usually specified by the manufacturer, 
but ultimately provided by the dealers themselves. Certified used cars typically sell for a 
premium over their uncertified counterparts. Yet, despite the growing popularity of vehicle 
certification programs, its critics have called into question its benefits relative to the premium 
(Cutler 2005). Our interest in this study is to examine the impact that the access to 
decentralized online information has on consumers’ value for certification, measured along 
two outcomes - demand for certified cars (demand effect) and the price paid for certified vs. 
non-certified cars (price effect). 
A well-established stream of analytical research examines certification (e.g., Albano 
and Lizzeri 2001; Lizzeri 1999, Viscusi 1978), and its role as an effective mechanism to 
supply quality information in Akerlof-type settings.  Empirical studies, while limited, point 
to the potential value of certification for consumers and firms in markets with information 
asymmetry such as those for collectibles, antiques, secondary goods, organic foods, and other 
hard-to-value products (e.g., Dewan and Hsu 2004, Jin and Kato 2006, Terlaak and King 
2006, Wimmer and Chezum 2003) 16. Certification potentially generates new information for 
all market players. On the one hand, certification plays an allocative role by allowing buyers 
to choose the type of vehicle that gives them the highest value, thereby, increasing demand 
from buyers who otherwise may have not entered the used market. On the other hand, buyer 
sorting also benefits sellers by providing information on buyer’s unobservable characteristics 
such as risk aversion (Ippolito and Mathios 1990, Jin et al. 2010). 
                                                 
16 Some existing empirical works find mixed outcome effects of mechanisms established to signal quality 
levels for services (e.g., occupational licensing (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000), professional certification 




3.2.2 Online Information 
In recent years used car buyers have additionally been able to access information 
from a variety of online sources that span the gamut from dealer and manufacturer 
websites, and third party auto review sites (edmunds.com, intellichoice.com, 
nadaguides.com, vehix.com), to consumer reviews catalogued in user generated sites 
(autoblog.com, technorati.com). Specialized auto sites offer advice on aspects such as 
reliability and safety (autocheck.com, carfax.com), information on financing and auto 
loan rates (bankrate.com, capitaloneautofinancing.com, USAA.com), and pricing specific 
to vehicle make-model-condition (kbb.com), for instance. Further, online consumers can 
avail of comparative shopping, and assess differences across vehicle models, based on a 
variety of attributes - a process that is painstaking and difficult to perform in the offline 
channel.  In keeping with these changes brought about by the Web, consumers are 
increasingly complementing their personal information search in offline channels with 
the decentralized information provided by these diverse online sources. The growing 
popularity of online information is also demonstrated by the fact that since 2004, a 
greater proportion of used vehicle buyers have found their car through the Internet than 
both newspaper and magazine classified ads combined (J. D. Power and Associates 
2006). Given consumers’ growing reliance on online sources it is vital to understand the 
impact that online information has on the value consumers place on traditional 
mechanisms used to lower uncertainty, such as certification. 
Dimensions of Online Information: We define four different types of information 
that consumers are likely to seek and obtain online. While used cars are generally less 




quality. Certified used cars, touted by car manufacturers as providing “the reliability of 
new and the affordability of used”, fall in between these two extremes. This price-quality 
trade-off lies at the heart of consumers’ choices. Hence, two distinct dimensions of 
information become salient in the context of used good purchases.  
The first dimension distinguishes between price vs. product related information 
about the alternatives (c.f. Kuruzovich et al. 2008). Product and price information play an 
important role in driving perceived value, which is a function of (perceived) quality and 
(perceived) price (Zeithaml 1988).The second salient dimension considers whether the 
online information is specific to the focal used vehicle (a particular used Lexus ES 350) 
or if it describes characteristics of vehicles of a make-model across its lifecycle (e.g., 
information about used, certified and new Lexus ES 350). This distinction, which we 
refer to as specific vs. comparative information, is especially important in a used good 
market. Given the extensive uncertainties in used good markets, comparative information 
may serve as critical reference points in helping consumers form inferences about the 
price and quality of the used alternatives (Wetzel and Hoffer 1982; Porter and Sattler 
1999).  
We cross-map these two dimensions (price-product and specific-comparative) to 
four categories of information that capture the multi-faceted structure of online 
information relevant to the purchase of used goods- namely, vehicle-specific product 
information, comparative product information, transaction-specific price information, 
and comparative price information. These are discussed in further detail in 3.3. 
Our study adds to the recent literature that examines the role and impacts of online 




analyzed the impact of online information on consumer outcomes such as offline purchase 
(Alba et al. 1997), price paid (Zettelmeyer et al. 2006) and channel choice (Kuruzovich et al. 
2008). Directly relevant to our study are works by Klein and Ford (2003) and Ratchford et al. 
(2003, 2007), that examine whether online information affects consumers' use of traditional 
information sources in the context of new automobile purchases. Their findings suggest that 
the Internet substitutes for time spent with a dealer and with third-party print sources such as 
ConsumerReports and Edmunds but does not decrease consumers' need for personal sources 
(friends and relatives). That the use of the Internet may affect consumers' reliance on 
traditional sources is an interesting and provocative observation – and is also one that 
motivates our study.  
Further, while much of the existing work on online information focuses on new 
good markets, online information search takes on added significance in the context of 
used good purchases. However, little is known about consumers’ choice and decision-
making in used good markets.  Also understudied is how online information affects 
consumers’ price outcomes in a market where final price is negotiated upon. Our setting - 
a large and economically significant secondary market - enables us to investigate the 
impact of online information on consumers’ choices and prices paid for used goods. 
3.3 Model and Hypotheses 
 
The quality of a used car is only imperfectly ascertainable before purchase. While 
consumers may know the average or expected quality of used vehicles of a certain make-
model from past experience of self or others and from marketing activities, they often do 
not know the true quality of any particular used car (Akerlof 1970). They may however 




uncertainty consumers face a corresponding value uncertainty stemming from not 
knowing the appropriate price to pay for the vehicle. Thus there is uncertainty about 
‘what the consumer gets for what she gives’ (Zeithaml 1988, p.13). Given our research 
interest in this paper, we focus on consumers’ choice between a certified and a non-
certified used car, which are otherwise similar (make-model-year-miles) but differing in 
expected quality17. Faced with quality uncertainty, on the one side, and a potential 
premium for certification, on the other, consumers choose based on their rational beliefs 
about seller behavior related to provision of certification and vehicle quality.  
3.3.1 Expected Quality of Certified and Non-certified cars in Equilibrium 
In the used car market, sellers have traditionally used certification to inform 
consumers about the underlying quality of the individual product (Lizzeri 1999; Pratt and 
Hoffer 1986). The presence of certification signals that the quality of the used vehicle lies 
at or above a threshold q*min or minimum quality level
18 (enumerated in the vehicle 
certification checklist). Prior literature on the voluntary disclosure of firms’ private 
information shows that non-disclosure cannot be a pooling equilibrium when sellers of 
higher quality goods have an incentive to defect- that is, they benefit by signaling their 
quality (Milgrom 1981; Grossman 1981). At equilibrium, truthful unraveling or 
“unfolding” occurs from the top until the cost of disclosing exceeds the benefits to the 
seller. This cost includes the expenses required to raise the quality of the used vehicle up 
to threshold level specified for certified vehicles. In addition, sellers must take into 
account or internalize the expected costs of repair for certified vehicles that breakdown or 
                                                 
17 As explained later, in our analyses we control for vehicle brand, year, miles, attributes and options using 
the VIN. 




suffer from problems. Thus, sellers (who wish to stay in business) will not find it in their 
best interest to sell as certified low quality vehicles whose expected costs of post-
purchase repair exceed the market value of certification. In other words, certification can 
be a credible signal resulting in a separating equilibrium if sellers of low and high quality 
vehicles indeed differ in their expected benefits.  
For this result to occur consumers must have common knowledge about the 
existence of such quality information in the market and sellers must benefit from 
disclosing private information. Trade literature suggests that an increasing number of car 
shoppers today are aware of and informed about certification programs (Mitchell 2008), 
and pay a premium to obtain certification suggesting that it is profitable for sellers. Thus, 
we expect that high quality sellers will be more likely to reveal their quality using 
certification. This result has several implications for the distribution of used cars 
available for sale in the market (c.f. Milgrom 2008).  
First, if quality is ex-post verifiable by buyers (e.g., low quality is correlated with 
breakdown and non-satisfactory performance) and cheating is costly for sellers (high 
expected costs of repairs for certified cars that default), low quality vehicles are more 
likely to be sold as non-certified (a notion that finds support in works by Jovanovic 1982 
and Lewis 2009). Second, since sellers typically face certification costs that are 
increasing in the quality difference between threshold and existing quality, used cars 
whose costs to certify (i.e. raise the vehicle quality to threshold) are much higher than the 
average certification premium in the market are more likely to be sold as non-certified 
(Jovanovic 1982). Third, since certification programs are standardized, thus disallowing 




credibly convey quality higher than q*min through disclosure (after controlling for age and 
mileage effects). As a result of the downward pressure on certified prices, sellers of very 
high quality certified cars will be worse off if they trade (Ronnen 1991). Very high 
quality cars may thus not be offered in the used car (certified) market.  The available 
certified cars will tend to be at or close to threshold quality q*min (Albano and Lizzeri 
2001; Milgrom 2008), and non-certified cars will have an expected value lower than 
q*min and a much larger quality variance. In the used car market, this reflects the 
important role of certification in providing consumers with information about the 
condition of the vehicle, including inspections/repairs that were performed to ensure a 
minimum standard of quality as specified in a manufacturer checklist. 
The above implications closely resemble the outcomes observed in real world 
used-car markets. Over the years, as certification programs have matured and a greater 
share of consumers are informed and aware of such programs, the average quality of 
(certified) cars that are traded has also improved. Sultan (2010) finds that non-certified 
cars required more maintenance expenditures than certified cars of a similar age. 
Furthermore, non-certified cars present a higher purchase risk given their higher quality 
variance, even if they do not differ much in expected quality levels. Stolyarov (2002) 
provides evidence of a double-hump regularity in used auto sales which supports our 
abovementioned arguments on the equilibrium distribution of used cars in the market. 
There are high sales of vehicles 3-5 years old and about 10 years old. Young vehicles less 
than 3 years have very low re-sale rates suggesting that owners of such high quality used 
vehicles prefer to keep owning them (or wait to sell) rather than obtain a price 




age group are unlikely to fetch certified prices, and are also perhaps valued higher than 
the price at which non-certified used cars sell. Their owners thus benefit from continuing 
to use the cars rather than sell them at lower average prices, leading to the observed 
patterns.  
Before we examine the impacts of online information, as a baseline, we first 
establish that consumers do indeed perceive differences between the expected quality of 
certified and non-certified cars. When consumers believe or conclude that certified 
vehicles are on average higher quality and lower variance than non-certified cars, this 
should be reflected in differences in their willingness to pay for the two types of used 
vehicles19. Our first hypothesis states that,  
HYPOTHESIS 1a.  Buyers pay a higher price for a certified car compared to a 
similar non-certified one. 
Next, we examine how the availability of online information alters consumer’s 
valuation of certification and impacts the demand and WTP for certified vs. non-certified 
used cars. 
3.3.2 Role of Online Product Information 
We summarize our main arguments for product information here before we 
examine each type of information separately. Past work in marketing literature has found 
that improving a (competitive) disadvantage attracts consumers from alternatives more 
than does improving a (competitive) advantage (Heath et al. 2000). When a price-
dominant alternative reduces its disadvantage in quality, its ability to attract demand 
                                                 
19 It is possible that consumers are willing to pay more for certification due to the availability of a warranty. 





away from a competing alternative is particularly significant since it offers more 
(perceived) quality at the same lower price. The implication for our work is that learning 
(which reduces uncertainty) about a product and its quality raises consumers’ perceived 
value more for non-certified cars than certified cars.  
Conditional upon choosing a certified or non-certified car, online product 
information can also impact consumers’ WTP when prices are negotiated. As a first order 
effect, learning more about the product and its features allows consumers to lower their 
uncertainties and find products that fit their preferences better. This raises their WTP. 
Additionally, online product information has a second-order effect on WTP that arises 
due to the important role that relative quality or quality differentiation plays in markets 
where quality uncertainty is a prevailing factor and absolute quality is difficult to 
ascertain. In the context of services, Boulding et al. (1993, 1999) and Inman et al (1997) 
propose that competitive alternatives enter explicitly into consumers’ evaluation of the 
focal service. In particular, Boulding et al. (1999) find that holding fixed the level of the 
focal service, a higher level of quality associated with a competitive alternative decreased 
the evaluated quality level of the focal service. Similarly, product information about the 
quality of used goods may alter the level of quality differentiation that consumers 
perceive. Certified cars present a unique proposition - higher quality at a premium. 
Consequently, consumers that buy certification will value it and pay more when the 
quality of certified car is sufficiently differentiated from the non-certified car. 




We show below that specific and comparative product information provide 
consumers with different types of knowledge about used vehicles, and therefore impact 
consumers’ demand and WTP differently. 
Product Information on Features and Specifications: Vehicle-specific product 
information found through online sources provides knowledge about a particular used 
vehicle. The Internet makes it easier for consumers to efficiently search large and 
complicated product spaces, and thereby plays an important role in allowing consumers to 
locate and learn about their particular used car. Vehicle-specific product information offers 
details on the various features and options available (e.g., airbags, ABS brakes, anti-theft 
locks, parking aids), the external and internal conditions combined with photographs and 
descriptions of the specific vehicle. This information may be broadly labeled as “search” 
attributes, referring to the fact that these characteristics are observable to the consumer with 
certainty upon pre-purchase inspection. Yet, to an untrained eye or inexperienced car buyer, 
the sheer number and variety of options available on cars today renders it difficult to learn 
about these features from merely visiting the dealer. Online sources may therefore aid 
consumers in becoming better informed about such search features20.  
Prior studies have found that when a product consists of a high proportion of difficult-
to-assess experience attributes, consumers may infer unobservable quality from observed 
product features either basing their inferences on certain correlated attributes or overall 
evaluations (Dick et al. 1990). In the used car market, customers who exhibit such tendencies 
will associate better fit of vehicle attributes with higher levels of unobserved quality.  
However, consumers that have alternate means of assessing quality will be less likely to 
                                                 
20 The availability of features is already reflected in the seller’s asking price; we are interested in examining 





make inferences from proxy attributes (Zeithaml 1988). Such an inference effect will 
therefore be more pronounced for buyers of non-certified vehicles with higher quality 
variance; whereas the presence of a quality signal in certified cars reduces consumers’ 
likelihood of generating quality inferences from search attributes21. For instance, learning 
about the features on a well appointed non-certified used car may lead consumers to judge it 
as being of higher quality than in the absence of such information. As a result, consumers 
that make such inferences will lower their valuation of certification, and be less likely to 
purchase certified cars.  Thus, with vehicle-specific online information about product search 
attributes, more consumers will prefer non-certified cars, thereby increasing its demand.  
HYPOTHESIS 2a. Vehicle-specific product information obtained from online sources 
reduces buyers’ likelihood of purchasing a certified car. 
Vehicle-specific information on available product features may also influence buyers’ 
willingness to pay for certified vs. non-certified cars. Past work has shown that learning 
about product features benefits heterogeneous consumers by allowing them to find better 
fitting products and reducing their price sensitivity, leading them to be willing to pay more 
(Boulding et al. 1994; Kaul and Wittink 1995; Mitra and Lynch 1995). Since information on 
search attributes is more likely to bear new information for non-certified cars, buyers may 
pay higher prices than in the absence of vehicle-specific product information. Further, 
improvement in the perceived quality of non-certified vehicles also lowers the perceived 
quality differentiation between certified and non-certified vehicles, which additionally raises 
consumers’ WTP for non-certified cars.  
                                                 
21 Search attributes by themselves need not be correlated with (unobservable) true vehicle quality and 
reliability. Further, certification checklists provide detailed information on the availability of features and 




In comparison, consumers who buy certified vehicles do not obtain new information 
from learning about product search attributes, and therefore do not make similar inferences 
about vehicle quality. Since they are unlikely to perceive a lowering in the expected quality 
differentiation, we conjecture that the WTP of certified car buyers is not systematically 
affected by the availability or lack of vehicle-specific product information. 
HYPOTHESIS 2b. Vehicle-specific product information increases the price paid by 
buyers for non-certified cars; while it is likely to have no significant effect on the 
price paid for certified cars.   
 
Product Information on Vehicle Quality: A second type of product information 
provides consumers knowledge about experience or quality attributes- which are, in contrast 
to search attributes, harder to ascertain prior to using the vehicle. Several websites on the 
Internet specialize in providing model reviews, consumer and expert ratings, and results for 
test drive, handling and crash-outcomes for automobiles. This extensive information about 
vehicle reliability and safety for new vehicles makes it feasible for consumers to gather 
knowledge about the quality of the focal used vehicle when it was new. Comparative product 
quality information pertains to the class of all vehicles of a particular make-model-year and 
not to any one specific vehicle; however, it may serve as a useful reference point for 
consumers to infer the residual quality of their focal used vehicle. Such effects have been 
observed by Sullivan (1998) and Purohit (1992) in the automobile market, and by 
Janakiraman et al. (2009) in other settings. They find evidence that when faced with 
uncertainty, consumers’ perceptions of quality of known products spill over onto other 




(new) 2006 Toyota Camry LE’s performance related to engine, transmission, driveline, 
steering and suspension, can help mitigate consumers' performance uncertainty associated 
with purchasing a used 2006 Toyota Camry LE. Moreover, several used vehicle 
advertisements also often highlight the tagline that “The best new cars make the best used 
cars”, referring to the notion that higher quality new vehicles are also likely to retain more 
quality when sold as used than models that start out lower in quality.  
Since consumers face high levels of quality uncertainty in this market, comparative 
product information about the unobserved quality of vehicles is important for both certified 
and non-certified used vehicles. However, such quality information is more valuable for non-
certified cars because of their greater variance in expected quality. Whereas for certified cars, 
this perceived quality increase may be limited because comparative product quality 
information provides less new information for certified vehicles, both due to the lower 
variance in quality and since some of the online quality information may even be redundant 
(also made available as part of the certification checklist). We therefore suggest that the 
availability of comparative product quality information helps increase the demand for non-
certified vehicles by making it attractive to some consumers who would have otherwise 
preferred to buy certification in the absence of such information 
HYPOTHESIS 3a. Comparative product information obtained from online sources 
reduces buyer's likelihood of purchasing a certified vehicle. 
Next, we examine the effect on WTP. Comparative product information benefits the 
non-certified vehicle in two ways. First, the improvement in expected quality (and variance) 
increases buyers’ WTP for non-certified vehicles than in its absence. Second, the decrease in 




consumers’ valuation and WTP for non-certified cars. For certified cars, these two effects act 
in opposing directions.  On the one hand, information that improves perceived quality lends 
further credibility to the certification signal and may increase the value of certification for the 
buyer. On the other hand, the lowering in perceived quality differentiation lays a downward 
pressure on consumers’ valuation of certified cars, similar to the ironical observation about a 
popular restaurant made by Yogi Berra, that "Nobody goes there anymore; it's too crowded.." 
In our context, when consumers perceive the used vehicle to be of sufficiently good quality, 
they may lower their valuation for certification. The net effect on WTP for certified cars 
depends on the relative strengths of the counteracting effects. We hypothesize that, 
HYPOTHESIS 3b. Comparative online product information increases the price paid by 
buyers for non-certified cars; while it is likely to have no significant effect on the 
price paid for certified cars.   
3.3.3 Role of Online Price Information 
The unique features of pricing in the used car market (and more generally, the car 
industry) – including that final prices are negotiated, prices vary much and often across 
dealers, and consist of multiple components- suggest that price information may play an 
important role in buyers’ purchase outcomes. A recent study by Busse, Simester and 
Zettelmeyer (2009), finds that car buyers are influenced not only by actual price information 
but also price cues. Not surprisingly then, the Internet has spawned numerous websites that 
provide valuable price-related information to consumers in the auto market 
Online channels allow consumers to research and discover better financing rates, and 
become aware of available incentives and offers. Such information is likely to lower 




reducing a (competitive) disadvantage is more valuable than improving a (competitive) 
advantage (Heath et al. 2000) we expect that improvements to the perceived price of 
alternatives will asymmetrically attract more demand towards the higher-priced certified cars 
than non-certified cars. This is supported in past work that documented that when prices are 
lowered, more consumers switch up to higher quality (and price) national brands from store 
brands rather than vice versa (Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989;  Sivakumar and Raj 1997). 
The recent cash-for-clunkers program, which gave buyers a credit of up to $4500 towards the 
purchase of a new (and more efficient) car, also remarkably increased sales of the new 
vehicles, many from buyers who would have typically spent less and bought used cars 
otherwise (Bunkley 2009). The result of this effect that lowers the perceived price of owning 
a car is to incentivize consumers to spend more as a result. 
A second effect of learning about prices in the market is to help buyers locate the 
seller with the lowest price and learn about the distribution of average prices in the market 
across new and used alternatives - information that can be useful in the bargaining process. In 
past work, it has been documented that consumers who obtain relevant price-related 
information from online sources use it to negotiate with the dealers for lower prices on their 
vehicle (Busse et al. 2006; Zettelmeyer et al. 2006). In recent experimental work, Mazar et al. 
(2009) demonstrate that price is a powerful contextual variable – and affected participants’ 
willingness to pay as they made inferences from the price distribution—going down for the 
left skewed distributions and up for the right skewed distributions. A key effect of learning 
about (low) price information then is to lower consumers’ WTP. Whether consumers pay a 




relative direction and strengths of these two effects. We discuss each type of price 
information next.  
Price Information on Financing and Incentives : The final price of a used car 
consists of several components. On the base price of the vehicle are included the price of 
additional “car” add-ons such as certification/warranties less any available incentives or 
promotions. Further, when the vehicle is financed, consumers also care about the interest 
rates and the resulting monthly payments. The Internet makes it relatively easy for buyers to 
access information related to financing rates and incentives associated with purchasing a used 
vehicle. Obtaining lower price information will in turn create favorable price perceptions in 
the consumer’s mind. This information denotes rates and offers that are applicable to the 
specific transaction for the car chosen by the consumer-hence, we refer to it as vehicle or 
transaction-specific price information.  
A typical concern of used car buyers is that certification is expensive. A quick 
observation of the auto market suggests that dealers are more likely to offer special rate 
financing schemes and more incentives for certified cars, mimicking the low rates available 
on new cars. Obtaining such information aids buyers to reduce monthly payments and can 
lower the perceived price of certified cars. We anticipate that reductions in the perceived 
price will increase the attractiveness and demand for the more expensive certified cars vis-à-
vis non-certified cars for reasons outlined below. 
Research on mental budgeting suggests that when consumers have budgeted an 
amount to a purchase - here, a used car -  (unexpected) favorable changes in the price of the 
product  may produce a perception of savings from the transaction and may result in a 




lead consumers to re-invest the surplus to buy more product (features/quality) for the money- 
a claim that has been supported in several empirical works (e.g., Ariely et al.2003; Heath and 
Soll 1996; Heilman et al. 2002; Janakiraman et al. 2006). Such a “savings effect” therefore 
encourages consumers to spend more leading to increased demand for high quality/high price 
alternatives. This is supported by recent findings from the auto industry that customers who 
were offered incentives (e.g., employee discount programs) thought that the overall prices 
were good enough that they could afford to buy a more expensive car (Busse, Simester and 
Zettelmeyer 2009). In related work, Gourville (1998) provides a related explanation that 
information about monthly payments induces a favorable temporal reframing that shifts 
consumers’ attention to smaller, less aggregate, ongoing expenses from larger, more 
aggregated and one-time expenses, thereby, reducing consumers’ perceived transaction costs. 
Transaction-related price information therefore plays an important role by increasing the 
attractiveness of and demand for the certified used vehicle. We accordingly posit that, 
HYPOTHESIS 4a. Vehicle/Transaction specific price information obtained from online 
sources increases buyer's likelihood of purchasing a certified vehicle. 
Conditional on choosing a used vehicle, the main role of price is as a measure of 
economic sacrifice. Thus, a direct effect of price-related information is to aid consumers in 
negotiating and paying lower prices for their used vehicle. The effect on WTP for non-
certified cars is to lower the WTP or the price paid by the buyers. The WTP for certified car 
buyers, in turn, is determined by two effects. First, the knowledge of price information 
enables them to bargain more successfully and obtain lower prices. Second, the increased 
attractiveness of certification due to perceived lowering of its cost may influence consumers 




consumers for certified cars to not be significantly different in the presence of transaction-
related price information than in its absence. We hypothesize that 
HYPOTHESIS 4b. Vehicle/Transaction specific price information lowers the price paid 
for non-certified cars; while it is likely to have no significant effect on the price paid 
for certified cars.   
 
Price Information on New, Used, and Trade-Ins: The second kind of price 
information allows consumers to learn about the market prices across a portfolio of available 
alternatives for a given make-model. For a vehicle of interest (say Audi A6), consumers may 
learn about the current average market value of the used good as a trade-in, as a retail 
offering across different quality conditions, and also as a new vehicle. Further, consumers 
may also learn about dealers’ invoice prices. Such information is comparative because it does 
not reflect the true (asking) price of any particular used vehicle; but rather serves as a 
reference point that the consumer may use to derive fair price estimates for their particular 
used vehicle. Learning about prices ranging from the low-end trade-in to the high-end new 
vehicle may more importantly invoke contextual inferences in a consumer who is purchasing 
a used vehicle. In the presence of uncertainty about the quality and fair price to pay for the 
used good, consumers may look to information available from the context (here, prices of 
new and used) to generate such inferences (Kamenica 2008).  In particular, consumers have 
been known to demonstrate a compromise effect (Kivetz et al. 2004; Simonson 1989; 
Wernerfelt 1995) or Goldilocks prici 0png effect (Shapiro and Varian 1999), whereby the 
inclusion of extreme-priced alternatives has been observed to increase the demand for the 




expected quality of new vehicles with the lower price but also lower expected quality of non-
certified used vehicles. In doing so, the middle option is often deemed to be the most 
attractive. In our context, this would be the certified car. We therefore expect that, 
HYPOTHESIS 5a. Comparative price information obtained from online sources 
increases buyer's likelihood of purchasing a certified vehicle. 
Once again, obtaining price-related information allows consumers to locate and 
bargain for lower prices on their used vehicle purchase. This impact should affect both 
certified and non-certified cars alike conditional on choice. In addition to this effect, for 
certified car buyers, there is a positive effect on WTP arising from the increased 
attractiveness of certified cars as middle option. Information about high-priced new cars 
enables consumers to better appreciate the value (price-quality tradeoff) of almost-new 
certified used vehicles, and increases their willing to pay for it. This is consistent with earlier 
marketing research on the compromise effect which finds that the presence of an extremely 
high-priced product alternative can increase the willingness-to-pay for more moderately 
priced products within a product category (e.g., Krishna et al. 2006). In our context, 
information that increases the value for certified cars also reduces the value for non-certified 
cars in a choice between the two. These effects of lowered WTP from better and informed 
bargaining and higher WTP due to greater attractiveness may counteract each other and 
result in no change in consumers’ WTP for certified cars with and without comparative price 
information. In contrast, as a consequence of comparisons across new and used alternatives, 
buyers who purchase the non-certified used vehicles may generate unfavorable quality 
inferences from comparative price information. If it were indeed the case, such an inference 




certified vehicles, which then additionally lowers their WTP. Thus the ability to negotiate 
lower prices is reinforced by the lower perceived attractiveness of the used car for buyers of 
non-certified cars. Thus, we expect that 
HYPOTHESIS 5b. Comparative price information lowers the price paid for non-
certified cars; while it is likely to have no significant effect on the price paid for 
certified cars.  
3.4 Empirical Study 
3.4.1 Data 
Our study is based on secondary data obtained from a survey of buyers, who purchased 1999 
to 2004 model year used vehicles in late 2003, conducted by one of the largest market-
research firms. The quota sampling strategy was designed to ensure that a sufficient sample 
size was obtained for car-make analysis, ensuring a minimum return of 125 purchases for 
nameplates with certification programs (and 120 for others). Two versions of an eight-page 
questionnaire along with a $1 incentive were sent out in late January 2004 (within 3 months 
of purchase), followed by a reminder postcard after a week. Out of the total mail-out to a 
randomized sample of 78,534 buyers, 12,142 surveys were returned resulting in a response 
rate of 15.5%. The dataset consists of both consumers who used the Internet as part of their 
purchase process and traditional consumers who did not use the Internet. Sampling weights 
are used to ensure that the distribution of makes in the sample was representative of the total 
personal use registrations of vehicles completed during the sampling period. 
We follow Zettelmeyer et al. (2006) in defining a “car” as the “interaction of make, 
model, body type, transmission, displacement, doors, cylinders, and trim level” (p.170). A 




allows us to adequately control for vehicle fixed effects. We restrict our analysis to the top 
135 "cars", each with at least 25 vehicle purchases, resulting in a total of 5,349 observations. 
Given our interest in comparing the effects of online information on certified and non-
certified purchases, we only retain "cars" with both types of sales22. Finally, we restrict our 
sample to cars purchased at dealerships, resulting in 126 “cars” with 3213 purchases, of 
which 35% were certified vehicles. 
3.4.2 Measures 
Table 3.1 summarizes the variables used in our empirical analyses. Our primary outcome 
variables are the choice of vehicle (certified or non-certified) and the price paid for the  used 
vehicle. * !('Z is a binary measure, while  * is measured in dollars. The 
independent variables are measured as follows. Online Z!' ('Z  is categorized into 
vehicle/transaction specific product  '
 and price  *
 information, and 
comparative product  '
 and price  *
 information. Buyers report on a 
multitude of online information found (0/1) by them during the course of shopping for the 
used vehicle they purchased (see Table 3.2). 
We employ principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation to reduce the 
dimensionality of online information into a set of four meaningful factors (with eigenvalues 
greater than one) that explains 79.98% common variance23.  ' includes access to 
vehicle photographs, and tools for assessing available features and specifications of the 
specific used vehicles.  * includes information on special offers, discounts and 
                                                 
22 We dropped 10 “cars” (68 luxury and 419 non-luxury purchases), resulting in a marginal decrease of certified 
purchases (33.09% vs. 33.78%), and slight increase in price paid. The new sample did not differ significantly in 
online information found by consumers.  
23We use factor analysis as means of reducing dimensionality while extracting underlying patterns across items. 




financing options, along with warranties and certification programs available on specific used 
vehicles of interest to a potential buyer.  ' includes historical performance, reviews, 
safety and crash test ratings, and road-handling abilities of vehicles in a given make-model 
class.  * includes prices of new vehicle alternatives and trade-in values for vehicles in 
a given make-model class.   
The dataset includes &*)x* characteristics such as 		, 	 #	, and 
x"# make. We construct 126 dummies to represent the "cars" described earlier. The 
dataset also contains information on +»*  demographics such as 		, (	, 	, 
x- *, # and  . Buyer’s pre-purchase intention is captured 
using dummies $ +	, $ Z	-, or '	 - to indicate the buyer originally only 
wanted to purchase a used vehicle, new vehicle or was open to both used/new. 
	,  +	 is equal to 1 if the buyer previously owned a used car. We include 
several additional controls in our analyses. 
Buyer’s access and use of offline information to search and locate the seller and/or 
purchased vehicle is captured by their use of classifieds/ads in newspapers, TV and 
magazines '	 (
, and recommendations from friends, relatives and/or own 
personal experience '	 	
. We use dummies to indicate whether the buyer 
obtained vehicle )#  	 prior to purchase (mostly provided by dealers in our 
sample), and whether buyers & 		 (	 '	 	. Market characteristics 
include dummies for 	, , or   indicating the type of market where the car 
was purchased. Seller type indicates whether the car was purchased from a Z	-  		 
or +	  		. Two measures –buyer’s overall  with the vehicle (1-10 




vehicle purchase – act as a proxy for unobserved short-term &		 ¼#. Finally, 
	 -# and ( -# are binaries equal to 1 if the vehicle had 
remaining manufacturer warranty and if the buyer purchased additional warranty (extended 
service contracts from the dealer)24.  
3.4.3 Empirical Model 
Our primary dependent variables are log price in equation (1) and the choice of certification 
in equation (2), which are modeled as a simultaneously affecting each other. In addition, 
following prior work that finds that consumer’s decision to obtain and use online information 
in automobile purchases is affected by several contextual and personal factors (Kuruzovich et 
al. 2008, Ratchford et al. 2003, 2007) we model consumers' acquisition of online information 
as endogenous in equation [3]. Below, Information = {CPROD, CPRICE, SPROD, 
SPRICE}. 
 * 1
 ½ Q £&*)x* Q  ¥+»* Q ¾* !('Z Q ¿Z!' ('Z Q
ÀZ* ('Z  Q  Á 'Z 'x­ Q ÂÃÄ¯[°´ Q Å­¯[°´    
    (1) 
* !('Z 1  ·½ Q ·£&*)x* Q  ·¥+»* Q ·¾ * Q ·¿Z!' ('Z Q
·ÀZ* ('Z Q ·Á 'Z 'x_ Q ·ÂÃ°´¯[Æ[°²[Ç¢ Q Å°´¯[Æ[°²[Ç¢  
     (2) 
Z!' ('Z 1  È½ Q È£&*)x* Q  È¥+»* Q È¾ 'Z 'x_ Q È¿Ã[¢ÆÇ¯É²[Ç¢ Q
Å[¢ÆÇ¯É²[Ç¢  (3) 
                                                 





The Z* ('Z vector is a set of centered cross products between 
* !('Z and the Z!' ('Z factors, and two interactions of 
CERTIFICATION with 		 and x"# make, to capture the differential impacts of 
certification across high mileage and luxury cars. Equations [1] - [3] include a vector of 
common &*)x* and +»*  variables, and offline information search variables- 
'	 (, '	 	, and & 		 (	 '	 	 dealer. Controls 
common to 'Z 'x_, 'Z 'x_ and 'Z 'x_ include 
$ +	, $ Z	-, '	 to vehicle type, &		 ¼#, , market 
size, and seller type. Additionally, 'Z 'x_ contains  6 	 		, 
)#  	, 	 -# and ( -#. Finally ÃÄ¯[°´, 
Ã°´¯[Æ[°²[Ç¢, and Ã[¢ÆÇ¯É²[Ç¢ are vectors of instruments that enable estimation of our 
system of simultaneous equations (1) – (3), as discussed below. 
3.4.4 Estimation Procedures 
While certification is not provided separately to consumers, the availability of detailed 
consumer, vehicle, and transaction-related controls as highlighted in Table 3.1 facilitate 
sophisticated estimation procedures that enable us to tease apart the impact of information on 
outcomes. We address several concerns that arise in estimating the parameters of interest in 
our system of equations. 
Treatment bias: Non-random selection into treatment conditions (here, the choice of 
certification) in the sample leads to biased coefficient estimates if ignored (Heckman 1979). 
In our study, treatment bias may arise from either demand-side or supply-side selection 
effects caused by unobservables. Demand-side selection arises when unobserved variables 




For instance, risk averse buyers are more likely to buy certified used cars but also likely to 
pay higher prices on average (if they believe higher prices proxy for higher quality), 
compared to buyers who are less risk-averse. Alternatively, savvy car buyers may be able to 
negotiate better prices for their certified vehicle, leading to a negative selection effect. In 
these cases, the coefficient of Certification in equation [1] would be over/under-estimated, 
respectively, as it captures not only the effect of certification, but also that of the correlated 
unobservables, on price.  We simultaneously estimate the price-certification equations to 
control for treatment effects using a selection correction term and an exclusion restriction25. 
A likelihood ratio test suggests the absence of demand-side unobserved selection in the 
purchase of certified vehicles- the correlation between equations [1] and [2] is .07, but the 
test of independence of equations is not rejected (χ2(1) = 1.27, p = .26). 
Similarly, there may be non-randomness in the vehicles that are chosen to be certified 
by the seller, leading to seller-side selection effects. Sellers may selectively choose to 
certificate certain types of vehicles (e.g., newer-model, low mileage, and luxury makes) that 
are more profitable to sell as certified, thereby upwardly biasing the coefficient of 
certification on price. The coefficient between Price and Certification in our sample is .19 (p 
< .01), suggesting either, that higher value cars are certified, or, that certified cars are priced 
higher. We deal with this issue by adding Price as an explanatory variable in [2].  
Error covariance: Another concern relates to the possibility of contemporaneous 
error covariance across equations (1) – (3) for a given buyer, indicating that common 
unobservables influence consumer's information acquisition, choice of certification and price. 
                                                 
25 The model includes a selection correction term that rests on the assumption of bivariate normality of 
residuals across (1) and (2). We additionally include Shop Certified, a dummy, to indicate buyers’ pre-
purchase intention to specifically shop for a certified vehicle. The use of an exclusion restriction helps by 




A related issue arises from the presence of a common subset of right hand side regressors that 
could also potentially confound the parameters of interest.  
Endogeneity: OLS assumptions may be violated due to the presence of reciprocal 
endogeneity between the choice of certification (1) and price (2) equations (Å­¯[°´ and 
Å°´¯[Æ[°²[Ç¢ are correlated) as discussed above. Another source of endogeneity in the system 
arises from omitted variables that affect online information and price (leading Å­¯[°´ and 
Å[¢ÆÇ¯É²[Ç¢ to be correlated), and online information certification (leading Å°´¯[Æ[°²[Ç¢ and 
Å[¢ÆÇ¯É²[Ç¢ to be correlated). Omitted variables that simultaneously affect the likelihood of 
obtaining online information, and the availability of certification and/or price would 
confound the coefficients of  ',  *,  ' and  * in (1) and (2). For 
example, popular models have a larger number of websites dedicated to them, and a greater 
availability of certified cars (due to larger volume of leases/trade-ins).  Thus, finding online 
information is potentially endogenously determined by unobservables driving the vehicle's 
price and certification status. In another example, if consumers who are likely to bargain 
heavily and pay lower prices are also more likely to obtain online information (because it is 
more valuable to them), then the effect of information on outcomes will be overestimated. 
In order to take into account both the effects of cross-equation error covariance and 
endogeneity, we employ the three-stage least squares technique (3SLS) that combines 2SLS 
and SUR (Greene 2003; Wooldridge 2002)26. Certification and online information are 
endogenous in equation (1), and online information and price are endogenous in equation (2). 
The set of instrumental variables ÃÄ¯[°´, Ã°´¯[Æ[°²[Ç¢, and Ã[¢ÆÇ¯É²[Ç¢ helps identify our 
                                                 
26The Hausman test of no endogeneity is rejected, supporting the use of simultaneous equations, while the 





system of equations (see Table 3.4 notes). The validity of the instruments is assessed by 
ensuring that the instruments are orthogonal to the residuals of the structural equation in 
which they serve as an instrument. In equations (1) and (2), the heteroskedasticity-robust 
overidentification test statistic Hansen-J is not rejected, ensuring validity. Instrument 
relevance is assessed using a combination of first-stage F-statistic, Shea partial R2, under-
identification and weak identification tests. The details are provided in the Appendix. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Main analyses 
Table 3.3 reports the summary statistics across the certified and non-certified sub-samples. 
Table 3.4 presents the main results of our 3SLS analyses. A linear probability model such as 
3SLS assumes that the dependent variable is continuous but this is not the case for the choice 
of certification. Aldrich and Nelson (1984)and Angrist and Krueger (2001)  demonstrate, 
however, that this is not necessarily a fatal problem since the consistency of the second-stage 
estimates does not depend on getting the functional form of the first-stage correct. Therefore 
linear regression is sufficient for our purposes. More importantly, we find robust results 
across our estimations using OLS/2SLS and 3SLS, regardless of whether the dependent 
variable is binary or continuous. We therefore believe that our results indicate a clear 
relationship between information and purchase outcomes. Next, we discuss our main results 
from the 3SLS model. 
The impacts of &*)x* Characteristics are shown in Panel A; effects of 
Z!' ('Z, * !('Z and Z* ('Z are in Panel B; +»*  




controls. Other control variables described earlier are included but not displayed. We outline 
our main results starting with the impacts on the retrieval of online information (models 
M1c—M1f), choice of certification (model M1b), followed by price paid (model M1a). 
Acquisition of Online Information: We find that vehicle characteristics- mileage and 
model year- do not impact buyer’s likelihood of obtaining online information. Several buyer 
characteristics on the other hand were significant. While demographic factors such as 
income, gender, and marital status did not matter, differences in minority status, education, 
and age affected what online information buyers obtained – with minorities and less-educated 
consumers less likely to obtain any online information. Additionally, consumers who 
previously owned used cars were less likely to seek comparative product information, while 
those who specifically shopped for a used car obtained more vehicle-specific product details 
and less information on new car offers and prices. Further, we observe that buyers who used 
classified/ads in offline channels were more likely to seek information online; while buyers 
who relied more on their friends/relatives were less likely to do so.  
Choice of Certification: We observe that buyers in our sample are more likely to 
purchase certification on higher mileage, older model, and more expensive cars. Further, 
being a female, being older, with previous ownership of used cars, and being in the market 
specifically for used cars, were associated with a higher likelihood of buying certified cars. 
Interestingly, the use of both offline impersonal and personal sources increased likelihood of 
purchasing certification. After controlling for the above factors, we find that online product 
and price information have disparate impacts on buyer’s propensity to buy certified vehicles. 
Both comparative and specific product-related information reduced the likelihood of 




information increased the likelihood of a certified purchase. Thus, hypotheses H2a, H3a, H4a 
and H5a are supported. 
Price paid: In the price model (M1a), we find that on average, buyers pay $80 less for 
each additional 1000 miles and an additional $1,645 more for a car newer by one year. As 
hypothesized (H1) our results show that buyers pay a premium (13.1% or $2,060 for an 
average car) for certification over a comparable non-certified vehicle. We however fail to 
observe any additional premium for certification of luxury and lower mileage cars27. On the 
one hand, luxury vehicles cost more to repair. Thus, in terms of costs of post-purchase repair 
and maintenance, obtaining a vehicle with lower risk or quality variance is more valuable for 
luxury cars than for non-luxury cars. Buyers may consequently attach more value to 
certification on luxury used vehicles. On the other hand, luxury cars are generally touted as 
having greater expected quality. If used luxury vehicles retain greater residual quality than 
similar aged non-luxury vehicles, buyers expect non-luxury used cars to display greater 
variance in quality (in addition to lower expected quality than luxury cars). If consumers 
perceive greater quality differentiation between certified and non-certified alternatives of 
non-luxury used cars, it follows that they will then place more value on certification for non-
luxury used cars, and pay a higher premium.  These effects are possibly masked in our 
aggregate estimates. The absence of additional premium for low mileage cars is likely an 
artifact of the mileage restrictions for certified cars.  
As for the impact of online information, we find once again that product and price 
related information have opposite effects on price paid. The main effect coefficients suggest 
that acquiring comparative and specific product information increased the price paid, while 
                                                 
27J.D. Power and Associates estimate the certification premium to be $1000 for non-luxury cars and $3000 
for luxury cars (2003), while the corresponding CNW Marketing Research estimates are in the range of 




comparative and specific price information lowered it. Recall that our interest in H2b, H3b, 
H4b and H5b is to examine whether obtaining online information led buyers to display 
greater willingness-to-pay for certified cars when compared to non-certified cars. The 
relevant results are the interaction effects (Table 3.4, panel B) between certification and the 
four information factors, all of which are insignificant in M1a. This suggests that either, 
consumers who obtain online information do not pay significantly different prices for 
certified versus non-certified used cars (due to better bargaining position, for instance) or, 
that the price paid for a certified car is not influenced by whether the buyer obtained online 
information or not. In order to tease out the effect of information on each type of used vehicle 
purchase, we proceed to analyze results for sub-samples of certified (M2a) and non-certified 
(M2b) cars as reported in Table 3.5. 
While the impacts of online information on price paid for certified vehicles remains 
insignificant, we observe a significant influence of online information on the price paid for 
non-certified used cars. We interpret the estimated coefficients on price paid as the relative 
change in price arising from one unit change in the regressors for the mean vehicle. For an 
average non-certified car in our sample, comparative product information increases price 
paid by $430 per unit of information, while specific product information increases price paid 
by $180 per unit of information, representing a premium of 1.2% - 3% of vehicle price. 
Comparative price information reduces price paid by $260 per unit of information obtained; 
whereas specific price information lowered price paid by $40 per unit of information, 
equaling .2% - 1.8% savings for an average used vehicle. Thus, hypotheses H2b-H5b are 
indirectly supported through the varied effects of online information on price paid for non-




information,  our estimates of the impact of per unit online information are comparable with 
previous research that found that price-related information provided consumers with 2% - 
16% price savings (Baye et al. 2003, Brown and Goolsbee 2002, Zettelmeyer et al. 2006).  
In summary, both types of product information were found to lower consumers’ 
choice of certification. However, as seen from the estimates above, the price paid by non-
certified vehicle buyers was more strongly influenced by comparative product information 
 ' (than  '). This is not surprising since in a market such as the one for used cars, 
information about unobserved vehicle quality and reliability would be more valuable to 
consumers than merely learning about available features and specifications (controlling for 
vehicle characteristics). Similarly, obtaining  * induced buyers to pay less for non-
certified cars than obtaining  * information. While both types of price information 
endows buyers with information critical to successful bargaining, if  * additionally 
leads consumers to infer quality from the prices of new and certified goods, buyers may be 
willing to pay lower amounts than with only  *.  
3.5.2 Post-hoc analyses 
We attempt here to shed some light on the process by which information affects outcomes. 
We conduct two sets of post-hoc analyses. In the first, we examine the reasons for purchasing 
their chosen vehicle provided by consumers who switched from originally intending to buy 
one type of vehicle (certified or non-certified) but then purchasing another. This subset of 
buyers altered their purchase decision as a result of obtaining online information, and 
controlling for other factors in the empirical model, allows us to more cleanly attribute the 
change to the information obtained. In the survey, buyers report on their purchase related 




obtaining the two types of product related information  ' vs.  ' influenced 
consumers in different ways to switch to buying non-certified vehicles. We find that those 
who obtained more  ' than  ' bought non-certified cars because they found 
vehicles that closely fit their needs for vehicle features and specifications. Whereas those 
who obtained more  ' than  ' were relatively more sensitive to quality related 
information and rejected vehicles based upon their history reports (see Table 3.6a). In terms 
of price paid, we find that non-certified buyers who believed that certified cars were better 
quality than non-certified cars paid less for their non-certified cars ($106 less vs. $268 less).  
Next, we examine buyers who switched from originally wanting non-certified to 
buying certified cars.  Buyers who obtained more  * than  * were more likely to 
report buying their particular vehicle due to greater satisfaction with their success in 
negotiating and financing their vehicle (see Table 3.6b). More buyers who switched to 
certified cars upon obtaining  * (vs.  *) said that they would not pay more for a 
certified car (68% vs. 57%), suggesting that they were less likely to attribute switching to 
obtaining higher quality. Among all certified car buyers, however, we observe that those who 
perceived that their vehicle was better quality than non-certified cars paid more premium 
than the average premium that buyers were willing to pay for certified cars ($467 more vs. 
$106 more).  
Buyers’ responses to the reasons for switching to the type of used vehicle that they 
purchased, when crossed with the information they obtained, provides additional insight that 
is consistent with our theorizing above. Thus, while both types of product (price) information 
lead consumers to be less (more) likely to buy certification; our results suggest that the 




factors into our empirical model due to the modest sample size of these subgroups, and leave 
it to future research to study them. 
Thus far, our findings highlight the important role of online information obtained by 
buyers in influencing key purchase outcomes. In our second post-hoc analyses, we further 
investigate whether consumers’ shopping or purchase goals affected their likelihood of 
obtaining different types of information. Specifically, we examine if there were any 
significant differences in outcomes for consumers whose original search set consisted of only 
used vehicles ($ +	
 compared to consumers who were open to purchasing new and 
used vehicles '	
. We observe that in the absence of the four types of online 
information, the buyers who $ +	 have a lower baseline propensity to buy 
certification (µ = 0.32, s.e.= 0.01) than Open buyers (µ = 0.40, s.e. = 0.02), which is 
significant at p<0.001. Ceteris paribus, we find that buyers who were '	 also obtained 
more comparative than specific information. Thus price information reinforces their 
propensity to choose certified cars, while product information has an opposite effect, 
decreasing their propensity to buy a certified used car. In contrast, for buyers who only 
$ +	 cars, product information reinforces their likelihood of not buying certified cars. 
However, $ +	 buyers who obtained price information are more likely to purchase 
certification. 
Prior to discussing the implications of our findings it is important to acknowledge the 
limitations of this work. First, we are limited by our reliance on secondary data collected by a 
third party. However, this detailed data set collected by one of the largest market research 
firms in the US represents one of the most extensive surveys of used vehicle buyers and the 




mitigated to a large extent by having each response correspond to vehicle registrations and 
tied objectively to a verified purchase. Yet, this remains a possibility. The 3SLS model 
exploits information regarding the correlations of the residuals across different equations in 
the system and therefore is theoretically more asymptotically efficient if there are common 
unobservables that affect all dependent variables. However, we cannot completely rule out 
the possibility that some of the observed differences in estimates across 3SLS and OLS could 
be due to misspecification of the instruments rather than superiority of simultaneous 
equations as an estimation approach.  
3.6 Discussion 
3.6.1 Implications 
Certified pre-owned programs help manufacturers keep used-car residual values high and 
create vehicles with higher resale values. Certified used cars are also believed to be more 
profitable to dealers. Consequently, manufacturers as well as dealers have a strong incentive 
to promote certified used cars. As for consumers, certification may increase aggregate 
consumer surplus by increasing the average quality of cars traded in the used vehicles 
market. Certification also expands the market by making luxury brand vehicles affordable to 
consumers that would have otherwise not been able to purchase them. However, since such 
certification is done by the manufacturers/dealers themselves, the value of such certification 
to consumers has been questioned. The presence of alternate mechanisms to lower 
asymmetry adds to this debate about the value of certification in the market for used cars. 
Our findings show that even after controlling for a wide range of potentially confounding 
variables, certified cars commanded a premium, suggesting that consumers have a positive 




Table 3.3 highlight significant differences between the population of certified vehicles and 
non-certified ones. For instance, certified vehicles were more likely to be low mileage with 
lower variance in usage (t = 6.97, p < .01), newer model year (t = 4.20, p < .01), and luxury 
makes (t = 8.52, p < .01). This suggests that consumers might benefit from the selective 
culling of certified used cars, which might be particularly valuable to risk-averse consumers 
as it allows them to enter the market for used vehicles. Thus buyers who might otherwise not 
consider purchasing a used vehicle might be able to purchase a certified used vehicle (Vella 
2006). We also find that consumers who were more satisfied (reported as >8 on a scale of 1-
10 vs. those less satisfied) with their certified vehicle were significantly more likely to: 
recommend their make-model to others (79% vs. 54%, p < .001), purchase a new vehicle of 
same make in the future (42% vs. 27%, p < .001), and purchase certified vehicles again (58% 
vs. 34%, p<0.001). Satisfied consumers who bought certified cars were also more likely to 
return to their dealer for post-purchase services than were similarly satisfied counterparts 
who purchased non-certified cars (83% vs. 66%), highlighting the additional benefits dealers 
get from certification. 
While certification, as seen above, plays an important role in the used vehicle market, 
one of the most significant developments in auto-retailing has been the dramatic increase in 
the amount and variety of online information available to consumers. However, the impact of 
such decentralized online information on consumer purchase behavior and choices has not 
been examined before. We find that, after controlling for detailed vehicle, buyer and market 
characteristics, buyer pre-purchase vehicle consideration sets, as well as offline information 




online sources. However, interestingly this impact depends on the type of information 









Certification Choice – + – + 
Non-Certified Price + –             +  – 
Figure 3.1: Impact of Online Information on Choice of Certification and Price of Used 
Cars 
While vehicle specific product information can help to reduce the knowledge 
uncertainty for consumers seeking used cars, comparative product information about the 
product class, including data on vehicle speed, handling, and road performance, and 
reliability, can help reduce performance uncertainty. We find that these two categories of 
online information – specific and comparative product information – reduce the likelihood of 
a buyer purchasing a certified used car, while significantly increasing the price paid for non-
certified used cars. Thus, from a seller’s perspective, (comparative and specific) product 
information is a substitute to traditional certification, and a complement to the sale of non-
certified used cars. On the other hand, vehicle/transaction specific price information can 
reduce the financial uncertainty, while comparative information about the price of new 
alternatives can help reduce economic uncertainty about the value of the purchase. We find 
that specific as well as comparative price online information increases buyers’ demand for 
certification, while reducing the price paid for non-certified used cars. Thus, from a seller’s 
perspective, the two categories of online price information complement traditional 
certification, and act as a substitute for the sale of non-certified used cars. These findings 
have significant implications for traditional dealers of used cars. Sellers of certified used cars 




transaction/price related information, while  sellers of non-certified used cars would benefit 
from providing consumers with greater access to information about specific product features 
and product information about new alternatives.  
Our findings also highlight implications for the strategic partnerships between 
traditional dealers and online information providers. Since online information providers vary 
in the type of information they provide, partnering or linking with the right online 
information providers would be mutually beneficial to dealers as well as online 
infomediaries. For instance, dealers of certified used cars would benefit from affiliations with 
online infomediaries such as Capital One Auto Finance, and E-loans.com that provide 
transaction information. In addition, they would also benefit from partnering with online sites 
that provide information on both used and new vehicles. As indicated by our results, buyers 
who obtained comparative price information were more likely to purchase certification, 
highlighting the interrelationships between new and certified-used car sales. Alternatively, 
dealers selling non-certified used cars (for instance, dealers of non-luxury and high-mileage 
used cars), as well as consumers, would benefit from dealers’ affiliation with online 
infomediaries such as AutoSafety.org, LemonaidCars.com, and CarFax.com that provide 
comparative product information that serve as a substitute to certification but complement 
non-certified used car purchases. Identifying the right online information partners would not 
only help traditional dealers target the right customer segments but also optimize their 
inventory of certified and non-certified used cars. Concomitantly, online infomediaries would 
also benefit by better highlighting the value of their information in reducing asymmetries in 




We also find in our post-hoc analyses that consumers who begin their automobile 
search with different purchase intentions differ in the impact online information has on their 
choice of certification. The online medium makes it possible for sellers to understand 
consumers' underlying search deliberations. For example, knowing that consumers are open 
to both new and used vehicles, the used car seller can increase consumers' likelihood of 
buying certification by offering comparative price information about new car alternative to 
highlight the value of purchasing certification. On the other hand for consumers whose 
consideration sets are limited to used cars, a seller can increase her revenue on non-certified 
used cars sales by providing the right product information.  
Our findings relating to buyer characteristics and their likelihood of obtaining online 
information have interesting implications. A recent survey conducted by Automotive 
Retailing Today, a coalition of automakers and dealers whose goal is to narrow the gap 
between media accounts of dealership conditions and consumers' experiences, finds that the 
majority of the minority buyers that were surveyed said that their dealership did not give 
them enough information to make an informed purchase, and that the dealerships often did 
not honor their commitments (Harris 2005). Our results indicate that minorities as well as 
less-educated consumers are also less likely to obtain the various categories of online 
information prior to their purchase. This has important implications for their welfare, as these 
are typically the same consumers who tend to be discriminated against by traditional dealers. 
Online information intermediaries can add greater value to these consumers who are more 
prone to discrimination in traditional channels. Currently, “the ‘Car Buyer’s Bill of Rights’ 
mandates dealers to reveal vehicle history along with a copy of the inspection report when 




(CIRP 2007). However, our findings suggest the need for stronger public policy measures to 
ensure greater transparency in transactions with disadvantaged consumers. 
Our results relating to the impact of online information on price of used cars also 
extend earlier findings. For instance, Zettelmeyer et al. (2006), find that online buyers paid 
on an average about 2% less than offline buyers for vehicles. In our study, by teasing out 
different types of online information sought by used vehicle buyers, we obtain more nuanced 
effects of online channel use. Another interesting finding relates to consumers’ use of online 
and offline sources of information. We find that while impersonal/ commercial sources of 
offline information (e.g., classifieds in TV/magazines/radio) complement online information 
search, the use of personal information sources (e.g., friends and relatives) serves as a 
substitute to online information search in the context for used cars – a likely indication of the 
importance of trust in the purchase of used goods. This suggests that dealers of used goods 
might benefit from cost-effective alternate quality signals such as reputation mechanisms and 
ratings from earlier transactions to engender greater trust in consumers. 
3.6.2 Conclusion 
Secondary or used good markets are an important part of the economy and have been 
growing rapidly in many product categories. Clearly, secondary markets are an important 
category for vehicle manufacturers and play an important role in the demand as well as the 
profitability of new cars for manufacturers, as well as dealers. The rapid growth of the 
Internet and decentralization of information has dramatically changed the balance of power 
between consumers and car dealers. Given that used cars are twice as profitable for dealers as 
new vehicles (CIRP 2007), understanding the impact of the changes brought about by 




have examined the impact of the Internet on the market for new cars, there have been very 
few studies of secondary markets in general, and more specifically the impact of the Internet 
on the market for used cars. Our study is among the first to examine the cross-channel 
impacts of different types of online information on the traditional market for used cars. In 
addition, we focus on the impact of the decentralization of online information on consumers’ 
value for a relatively centralized signal -certification on used cars. Our study highlights 
interesting relationships between different types of online information and consumers’ value 
for certification, and points to the need to disentangle these effects empirically to better 
understand their differential impacts on the outcomes of interest to buyers and sellers. More 
broadly, our findings about the impact of the different types of online information on 
consumer demand for traditional quality signals and price outcomes provide useful 
guidelines for other secondary markets with disclosure, and also perhaps, markets for 
certified products that rely on quality labeling.  
While the primary focus of this study has been on the impact of online information on 
certification, other mechanisms such as seller quality, warranties, product guarantees, and 
branding, also serve to reduce information asymmetries in many markets. It would be useful 
to examine the impact of the increased availability of online information on alternate quality 
signaling mechanisms. In addition, while this study examines the impact of online 
information on consumer choices in a classic offline lemons market, it would be interesting 
to study the effect of such decentralized information on quality signaling mechanisms in 
online secondary markets such as EBay and Amazon Marketplace, which have gained 
prominence. This study is a first step in understanding how the Web and digitization 




sources of information to one supported by distributed/ decentralized information. The 
implications of this development for consumers and marketers across other markets remains 




Table 3.1. Operationalization of Constructs 
 
Construct Operationalization 
Vehicle Price Total Price in $ (excl. tax, license, trade-in) 
Certification 1 – Purchased certified vehicle; 0 – otherwise 
Model Year Vehicle Model Year (1999 up to 2004) with base year 1998 
Mileage  Miles at Purchase /1000 
Luxury Make 1 – If Luxury nameplate; 0 – otherwise 
Annual Income 15 ordered intervals ranging from less than $25K to over $250K (pre-tax income) 
Minority Race 1 – If African American or Hispanic; 0 – otherwise 
Low Education 1 – If less than a high school graduate, 0 – If more educated 
Gender  1 – Male; 0 – Female 
Age Age in Years 
Married 1- Yes; 0- No 
Previous Used Car 1 – Has previously owned a used car; 0- otherwise 
Pre-purchase intention  Dummies for Want Used, Open, and Want New 
Use offline classifieds/ads Average of 2 items: use of offline classifieds/ads to locate and research vehicle 0-1 
Use offline personal sources Average of 2 items:  use of prior experience and personal recommendations to locate and research vehicle 0-1 
Visit Online Before Dealer 1 - conducted online search prior to visiting dealers; 0- otherwise 
Comparative Product CPROD Average of 4 items corresponding to online information found on a scale of 0-1 
Comparative Price CPRICE Average of 3 items corresponding to online information found on a scale of 0-1 
Specific Product SPROD Average of 3 items corresponding to online information found on a scale of 0-1 
Specific Price SPRICE Average of 4 items corresponding to online information found on a scale of 0-1 
Seller Type New car dealer or Used car dealer 
Market size Dummies for Rural, small, metro 
Vehicle History Reports 1- If the buyer had access to a vehicle history report prior to purchase, 0 otherwise 
Remaining OEM warranty 1- if vehicle had remaining original/manufacturer warranty; 0- otherwise 
Additional Warranty 1 – Purchase additional warranty; 0 – otherwise 
Satisfaction with vehicle overall quality  10 point scale for overall rating of vehicle 




Table 3.2. Factors for Online Information Search 
 
Please tell us whether you found this information while searching on the Internet (Yes/ No) 
Information Found While Searching Online F1:CPROD F2:CPRICE F3:SPROD F4:SPRICE 
Road tests/articles about vehicles 0.81 0.19 0.16 0.11 
Performance data on vehicles (speed, handling, etc.) 0.79 0.10 0.26 0.10 
Vehicle reliability information 0.75 0.21 0.10 0.11 
Safety information 0.70 0.08 0.23 0.22 
Price of used vehicles 0.13 0.89 0.11 0.05 
Trade-in values 0.12 0.87 0.10 0.03 
Prices of new vehicles 0.14 0.81 0.12 0.24 
Dealer cost/invoice of new vehicles 0.10 0.62 0.09 0.28 
Used vehicle photographs 0.20 0.11 0.89 0.25 
Size and dimensions of vehicle 0.17 0.12 0.88 0.13 
Options and features available on used vehicles 0.20 0.14 0.82 0.15 
Locate used vehicles for sale -0.06 0.00 0.65 0.19 
Tool for calculating monthly payments 0.11 0.07 0.21 0.88 
Service contract/extended warranty information 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.87 
Special financing/discount offers 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.78 
Information on certified used vehicles 0.15 0.01 0.19 0.75 









Table 3.3. Differences Across Non-certified and Certified Samples 
 
Variables          Non-Certified Cars 
             (N =2094) 
   Certified Cars 
  (N = 1119) 
t- Statistics  
(df = 3211) 
Vehicle Characteristics 
Price paid ($1000) 14.83  (7.26) 17.62 (7.88) t = -10.06  
Miles on Vehicle (000’s) 35.82  (20.75) 30.78  (17.00) t =    6.97  
Model year 2.87  (1.35) 3.07  (1.31) t =   -4.20  
Luxury  0.20  (.40) .34  (0.47) t =   -8.52  
Consumer Demographics 
Age 47.58  (14.99) 49.65  (14.76) t =    -3.75  
Gender .59  (.49) .56  (.50) t =     1.88  
Low Education .26  (.44) .23  (.42) t =    1.80  
Income 5.88  (3.32) 6.40  (3.50) t =   -4.14  
Minority Race .06  (.24) .10  (.29) t =   -3.25  
Married .70  (.46) .71  (.45) t =   -0.94  
Consumer Experience/ Psychographics 
   Previous Used Car .63  (.48) .58  (.49) t =    2.79  
   Want Used vehicle .65  (.48) .58  (.49) t =    4.35  
   Open to New and Used .30  (.46) .36  (.48) t =   -3.46  
Online Information  
CPROD .33  (.40) .38 (.41) t =   -3.51  
CPRICE .34  (.39) .40  (.40) t =   -3.87  
SPROD .44  (.46) .50  (.44) t =  - 3.06  
SPRICE .16  (.27) .24  (.32) t =   -6.67  
Controls 
   Visit online before dealer .43  (.50) .46  (.50) t =   -1.85  
Offline Classifieds/ads .56  (1.16) .57  (1.16) t =     -.22  
Offline Personal .25  (1.27) .23  (1.26) t =      .35  
Bought from metro market .16  (.36) .19  (.39) t =   -2.47  
Bought from small market .42  (.49) .48  (.50) t =   -2.87  
Bought from new vehicle seller .70  (.46) .84  (.37) t =   -8.72  
Additional warranty .82  (.38) .32  (.47) t =  32.90  
Original Manufacturer warranty .49  (.50) .53  (.50) t =   -2.22  
Obtained history reports .29  (.46) .40 (.49) t =   -5.96  
Short term defects (problems) .80  (1.31) .81  (3.22) t =     -.40  
Satisfaction with vehicle quality 7.95  (1.92) 8.24 (1.92) t =   -4.21  
* p <.10,   ** p < .05, *** p < .01; unpaired sample t-tests. Standard deviation is shown in parentheses.  
 
Notes:
 The greater mean is italicized, while significant t-statistics are in bold. Our sample is 58% male, 
7.50% minority (African Americans/Hispanics), and 25% low education (high school and below) buyers 
with a median age of 48 years. 75% of the purchases were made with new car dealers. Buyers provided 
detailed accounts of their valuation and use of vehicle certification programs, and online and offline 
information search processes. 35% purchased a certified used vehicle, and 61% had previously owned a 
used car. 56.2% buyers used the Internet to shop for their used vehicle, and spent an average of 7 hours 
searching 1.96 (SD = 2.53) third-party, 1.42 (SD = 2.58) manufacturer, 1.95 (SD = 3.89) dealerships, .31 
(SD = 1.22) newspapers and .05 (SD = .50) chat room/bulletin board websites. 78% of Internet users 




















A. VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Miles -.005 .039 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 
 (.000)*** (.005)*** (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Model Year .099 -.794 -.008 -.005 -.008 -.001 
 (.005)*** (.096)*** (.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) 
Ln Price  7.939     
  (.857)***     
B. CERTIFICATION AND ONLINE INFORMATION 
Certification .123      
 (.019)***      
Certification * Miles .000      
 (.004)      
Certification * Luxury .018      
 (.066)      
CPROD .090 -.987     
 (.023)*** (.119)***     
CPRICE -.084 1.314     
 (.027)*** (.163)***     
SPROD .029 -.562     
 (.016)* (.082)***     
SPRICE -.093 .951     




     




     




     




     
 (.032)      
C. BUYER DEMOGRAPHICS AND PSYCHOGRAPHICS 
Income .001 -.024 .001 .003 .000 .001 
 (.002) (.017) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Minority .003 .114 -.050 -.060 -.059 -.037 
 (.017) (.169) (.020)** (.019)*** (.019)*** (.017)** 
Low education .014 -.152 -.048 -.040 -.055 -.011 
 (.010) (.109) (.013)*** (.012)*** (.012)*** (.011) 
Gender (male) .015 -.239 -.004 .015 .000 .003 
 (.010) (.097)** (.011) (.011) (.011) (.010) 
Age -.001 .007 -.000 -.001 -.002 -.000 
 (.000)*** (.004)* (.000) (.000)** (.000)*** (.000) 
Married -.015 .089 -.001 -.001 -.005 .005 
 (.010) (.109) (.013) (.012) (.012) (.011) 
Previous Car Used -.012 .161 -.020 -.016 -.003 -.011 
 (.010) (.092)* (.011)* (.011) (.010) (.009) 
Want Used -.063 .742 -.018 -.028 .020 -.014 




D. CONTROLS: (OFFLINE) INFORMATION SEARCH 
Use of classifieds -.011 .096 .044 .042 .066 .026 
 (.004)*** (.042)** (.005)*** (.005)*** (.004)*** (.004)*** 
Use of personal 
sources 
-.013 .118 -.024 -.023 -.033 -.020 
 (.003)*** (.036)*** (.004)*** (.004)*** (.004)*** (.004)*** 
Constant 3.345 -26.240 -.137 -.195 -.112 .005 
 (.076)*** (2.998)*** (.092) (.087)** (.086) (.078) 
Fit statistics R2= .60 R2=.12 R2= .49 R2= .51 R2= .63 R2= .30 
* p <.10,   ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
Notes: N = 3213 purchases in all models. The online information factors are multiplied by a factor of 10 in 
M1a and M1b. All models M1a-M1f contain 125 car dummies for vehicle make-model-trim fixed effects. 
Additional controls (not shown) common to the price model M1a and choice of certification model M1b 
are market area (rural, small, metro), type of seller (new vehicle or used vehicle dealer), one of the short 
term quality variables- number of post-purchase defects, order of online search compared to dealer visits, 
and consumer psychographics- Want Any. The price model M1a contains additional controls- buyer’s 
satisfaction with overall vehicle quality, availability of vehicle history reports, remaining manufacturer 
warranty and purchase of additional warranty. Interaction components are centered to reduce 
multicollinearity. All variables in panel B are modeled as endogenous and estimated using the instrumental 
variables technique with a surfeit of instruments. Details of the IV regression are provided in the Appendix. 
 
















     
CPROD .090 -.987 .110 -.015 
 (.023)*** (.119)*** (.032)*** (.016) 
CPRICE -.084 1.314 -.036      .028  
 (.027)*** (.163)*** (.021)* (.031) 
SPROD .029 -.562 .053 -.013 
 (.016)* (.082)*** (.025)** (.013) 
SPRICE -.093 .951 -.107 -.001 
 (.020)*** (.091)*** (.031)*** (.014) 
     
Observations        3213       3213       2094      1119 
Fit statistics R2= .60 R2=.12 R2= .68 R2= .86 






χ2(151) =  
7914.57*** 
* p <.10,   ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Standard errors shown in parentheses.  
Notes: The online information factors are multiplied by a factor of 10 in M1a and M1b. Model M1a and 
M1b for the pooled sample are reproduced from Table 4 for comparison purposes. The results from 
applying 3SLS to the non-certified sub-sample and certified sub-sample are shown in M2a and M2b, 
respectively. 
As noted in the paper, an increase (decrease) in the likelihood of purchasing a certified used car 
corresponds to a decrease (increase) in the likelihood of purchasing a non-certified used car. Thus M1b and 
M2a taken together indicate the complementary/substitutive effects of product and price information on 
non-certified used cars.   
The controls variables included in models M1a-M1b and M2a-M2b are the same as those described in the 
notes for Table 4. All four online information variables in M2a and M2b are modeled as endogenous and 





Table 3.6a. Comparing the Reasons Reported for Purchasing Chosen Vehicle by 
Consumers Who Obtained Product Information (SPROD vs. CPROD) 
 
Reason SPROD CPROD 
The exact vehicle I wanted was not Certified 14% 1% 
Seller had the exact vehicle (color, options, etc) I wanted 51% 33% 
Obtained more features for the same price 22% 8% 
Satisfied with the vehicle condition- explanation of features, cleanliness etc. 7.09 6.80 
Obtained vehicle history reports 40% 66% 
Rejected vehicles based upon the contents of this report 14% 25% 
 
Table 3.6b. Comparing the Reasons Reported for Purchasing Chosen Vehicle by 
Consumers Who Obtained Price Information (SPRICE vs. CPRICE) 
 
Reason SPRICE CPRICE 
Seller offered attractive financing 18% 13% 
Hassle free negotiation 50% 44% 
Satisfaction with paperwork/finance process 8.50 7.90 
Special financing offer/discount included  with certification 47% 28% 






Chapter 4: Epilogue 
The Internet as an expanding channel for commerce fundamentally changes the way in which 
parties involved in electronic transactions interact with one another. While this new medium 
poses some challenges, especially those that stem from information asymmetry between parties, it 
also allows for the creation and design of new ways to deal with such frictions. One such 
mechanism, and a key variable in electronic markets, is the availability of online information. 
This has led to buyers and sellers devising new strategies to manage the acquisition and provision 
of information, respectively. 
The Internet facilitates two-way information exchange, where consumers seek and search 
for information about products and sellers, and in doing so, are also indirectly offering 
information about themselves to the firm in the form of their information-seeking behaviors. With 
the development of new technologies to track and capture consumers' search behaviors, firms 
today have access to a powerhouse of information about consumers' underlying needs and 
preferences.  My dissertation highlights the importance of studying consumers' information 
seeking behaviors in the online medium. In the first essay, the information obtained by consumers 
is centrally and directly provided by the seller, whereas in the second essay, the impacts of 
decentralized information gathered from several online sources that are available to consumers 
seeking to purchase durable goods is examined. The findings from these studies show that 
consumers' search patterns reflect 'meaningful' information about consumers' information needs 
and preferences. Further, this information is important for firms because it allows them to 
strategically and optimally interact with customers by customizing the provision of information to 
suit their needs.  
The findings from this dissertation add to the streams of literature that study the impacts 
of information obtained by consumers in online channels. Additionally, the impacts of product- 




markets are separately quantified. Essay 1 shows that online information can impact consumers' 
decision-making at a very fine-grained level and that it is fruitful to examine the different impacts 
of information across various decision stages faced by online consumers. I find interesting 
tradeoffs between the effects of information on purchase outcomes within a session and across 
sessions for a given consumer. Uncovering consumer segments that respond differently to 
information interventions is likely to be a useful finding for online firms. e-tailers can leverage 
this knowledge to fine-tune or micro-customize their online information provision strategies to 
consumers, and obtain better market outcomes. Essay 2 sheds light on the cross-channel impacts 
of online information on how consumers value traditional quality signals. As internet markets 
continue to mature, online consumers today find themselves faced with several quality signals. It 
is therefore important and useful to study how various sources of information interact with one 
another. For instance, how does the presence of one signal or source of information impact 
consumers' valuation of another? This essay takes a step towards answering this important 
question. It examines the dynamics between a traditionally used signal of quality in secondary 
markets and information related to the purchase of used goods available today in online channels. 
The findings reveal interesting patterns of substitution and complementarity among four types of 
online information and certification. Once again, these results suggest that firms should pay 
attention to what kinds of information they provide to their consumers; because information leads 
consumers to make different choices and face different outcomes.  
In conclusion, the essays from this dissertation seek to inform firms in designing better 
ways to interact with consumers' through the provision of online information. As the digitization 
of markets continues, it also opens new grounds and presents several novel opportunities to 
sellers- one of them being the management of online information. Sellers that learn to leverage 
the power of information to help better interact with their consumers in digital markets will be 
better positioned to succeed, and this dissertation was a step toward helping firms to better 





APPENDIX A: Observed Behaviors Across Buyers and Non-Buyers 
  
Figure A1a. Distribution of the number of pages viewed in a session across non-buyers (left 
panel) and buyers (right panel) 
 
Figure A1b. Distribution of the session length (minutes) across non-buyers (left panel) and 
buyers (right panel)
 
Figure A1c. Distribution of the number of products viewed in a session across non-











































































































APPENDIX B: Details of the Instrumental Variable Regression  
 
Endogeneity 
In the presence of endogeneity, OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent (Maddala1992), whereas 
properly specified 2SLS/3SLS models are consistent. Further, in the presence of contemporaneous error-
covariance, a method like 3SLS that makes use of the cross-equation correlations of the disturbances is 
asymptotically more efficient than 2SLS, and is the one we use.  
Our system of equations (1)-(3) is described in the main paper The 3SLS procedure is as follows: 
(1) Each endogenous variable in the system (here, Certification, Certification X Miles, Certification X 
luxury, CPROD, CPRICE, SPROD and SPRICE, and Certification X Online Information, and PRICE) is 
regressed on all of the exogenous variables in the system, and predicted values of the endogenous 
variables are calculated in the first-stage. (2) These predicted values are used as instrumental variables for 
the endogenous variables in the second-stage OLS regressions, from which estimates of error terms and 
variance-covariance matrices are obtained. (3) Using the cross-equation disturbance correlation estimates, 
generalized least squares estimation is applied to a single equation representing all the system equations.  
Instruments 
The price model (1) contains 11 potentially endogenous regressors. We identify a total of 12 instruments: 
a binary variable-Shop Certified -that describes that the buyer intentionally shopped only for a certified 
vehicle; and interactions of Shop Certified with Miles and Luxury. Further, we use as an instrument 
buyers’ belief that there is Value in certification programs (1-10). A set of four variables that measure the 
buyers' ratings of the importance of each type of information on a scale of 1 to 10, i.e. importance of 
comparative and vehicle-specific price and product information are used to instrument online information. 
Finally, the interactions between Shop Certified and the four importance of online information variables 
are used as instruments for the interaction terms The certification equation (2) contains 5 potentially 
endogenous regressors- four online information factors and price. Two variables are used to instrument 




best deal for the money. Finally, we use a dummy to indicate whether the buyer shopped for a specific 
vehicle. 
We need at least as many instruments as there are endogenous regressors in each equation. 
However, while the asymptotic efficiency of the estimation improves as the number of instruments 
increases, but so does the finite-sample bias (Hahn and Hausman 2002, Johnston and DiNardo 1997). 
Thus, we chose a parsimonious non-redundant subset of instruments needed to appropriately identify our 
system, by examining subsets of the orthogonality conditions using difference-in-Sargan or C tests 
(Hayashi 2000).The instrumental variables regression is estimated using STATA 9.2’s ivreg2 and reg3 
procedures (see Baum et al. 2003, 2007), and the statistics are reported in Tables A1 and A2. 
We first test for the presence of endogeneity in each single equation model (1) and (2) using a 
form of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test that is robust to various violations of conditional homoskedasticity 
(Baum et al. 2007, p.16). The test statistic is rejected for both Price [1] (X2(11) = 26 (p<0.00)) and for 
Certification (2) (X2(5) = 36.19 (p<0.00)), suggesting the need to account for endogenous regressors. 
We also find evidence of the presence of significant heteroskedasticity in our models using the 
Pagan and Hall test statistic (appropriate for IV estimation given sufficient sample size): for Price, χ2(1) = 
11.73 (p<0.00) and for Certification, χ2(1) = 58.17 (p<0.00). We therefore estimate equations (1) and (2) 
using heteroskedasticity-robust IV techniques with sandwich V-C matrices. Next, we provide details of 
the diagnostics/tests conducted to ensure the validity and relevancy of our instruments.  
Validity and relevance of instruments 
Good instruments must be both valid and relevant to ensure that the model is identified. We examine the 
validity of the overall set of instruments by examining the orthogonality (exogeneity) of the instruments 
to the structural equation (Price or Certification) using a heteroskedasticity-robust overidentification test 
(numerically equivalent to Hansen J as shown by Baum et al. 2003). This is an omnibus test, with the null 
hypothesis that all the excluded exogenous variables, the instruments, are uncorrelated to the regression 
error in the main equation. This statistic is chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the 




estimates will be inconsistent. We however fail to reject this statistic for both Price (χ2(1) = 1.42 
(p=0.24)) and Certification (χ2(2) = 2.92 (p=0.23)) equations, ensuring that the instruments are valid or 
orthogonal to the residuals in the structural equations.  
Additionally, we want our instruments to be relevant, or significantly correlated with the 
endogenous regressors they replace. This is a test of the rank condition that each of K canonical 
correlations (K= endogenous regressors) is different from zero. In Tables A1 and A2, we present the 
partial R2, Shea partial R2 (which takes into account correlations among instruments), and the first-stage 
F-statistics. For a model with a single endogenous regressor, an F below 10 is a cause for concern as 
shown by Staiger and Stock (1997). However, in models with multiple endogenous regressors, as is the 
case in equations [1] and [2], additional diagnostics are required (Stock and Yogo 2005). We therefore 
also examine the Kleibergen-Paap statistics for under-identification, which is appropriate under the 
presence of heteroskedasticity (Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (robust 
versions of the Anderson LM based on null that the smallest canonical correlation is not different from 
zero) tests the null that the model is of rank K-1, i.e. underidentified. We reject the null in both equations 
for Price (LM χ2(2) = 110.24, p<0.00) and Certification ( LM χ2(3) = 116.00, p<0.00), suggesting that the 
models are not under-identified.  
As discussed in several papers in recent econometrics literature, under-identification is not a 
sufficient shield from weak-identification which causes additional problems of inference (Hahn and 
Hausman 2002, Staiger and Stock 1997, Stock et al. 2002). Weak identification occurs when the 
correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variables is small. In such a case, it magnifies the 
effect of any correlation between the instruments and the error in the original structural equation, and 
leads to inconsistent IV estimates (Bound et al. 1995). Additionally, as the first stage R2 approaches zero, 
finite sample results may differ substantially from asymptotic theory (causing greater bias in IV). Thus 
Stock and Yogo (2005) provide two tests to assess the effects of weak instruments based on maximal 
relative bias of IV and test size. The first is a test of the bias in IV compared to the bias in OLS. The 




endogenous regressor in the structural equation is zero), which rejects too often when identification is 
weak. Rejection of the null provides an estimate of the IV rejection rate for β when the true rejection rate 
is 5% (see Baum et al. 2007, p.24). The corresponding Kleibergen-Paap rk F-statistic for equation [1] is 
12.79 and for equation [2] is17.81.  
Finally, we assess the joint significance of multiple endogenous variables in our structural 
equations [1] and [2] using the Anderson-Rubin test (1949). This test is robust to weak instruments (i.e. is 
less likely to reject in their presence). The null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors are not 
significant is rejected in equation [1] (χ2(12) = 61.61, p<0.00) and [2] (χ2(7) = 49.95, p<0.00). These 
results indicate that the endogenous regressors are significant in their respective structural equations. The 





















2 .28 .55 .47 .61 .55 .41 .51 .16 .14 .14 .19 
Shea partial R
2
 .26 .52 .36 .56 .52 .41 .35 .12 .12 .10 .10 
First stage  























*** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 
Notes: Structural model: N=3213, Excluded Instruments = 12, Endogenous Regressors = 11, F(158, 3054) = 143.41***, R2 = 0.84    
Test for heteroskedasticity in fitted values- Pagan Hall test statistic: χ2(1) = 11.67*** 
Under-identification test: Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic χ2(2) = 111.04***     
Weak identification test Kleibergen–Paap rk F-statistic = 12.79 
Over-identification test Hansen J: χ2(1) = 1.40 (p=0.24) 
Joint significance of endogenous regressors in structural equation Anderson–Rubin Wald test χ2(12) = 61.61***   
Endogeneity of endogenous regressors: DWH test χ2(11) = 26.37*** 
 
Table B2. Instrument validity and relevance statistics for certification equation (2) 
Model 
 
Ln Price CPROD CPRICE SPROD SPRICE 
Partial R
2 0.05 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.24 
Shea partial R
2
 0.04 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.10 
First stage  











*** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 
Notes: Structural model: N=3213, Excluded Instruments = 7, Endogenous Regressors = 5, F(148, 3064) = 4.69***, R2 = 0.84 
Test for heteroskedasticity in fitted values- Pagan Hall test statistic: χ2(1) = 58.27*** 
Under-identification test: Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic χ2(3) = 116.01*** 
Weak identification test Kleibergen–Paap rk F-statistic = 17.81 
Over-identification test Hansen J: χ2(2) = 2.92 (p=0.23) 
Joint significance of endogenous regressors in structural equation Anderson–Rubin Wald test χ2(7) = 49.95*** 
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